THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume XII | MAY, 1948 | Number 4

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The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscriptions: $3.00 a year (foreign, $3.30); single copies 80 cents (foreign, 90 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals,* New York City.

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RELIGION UNDER THE LIAO DYNASTY*
(907-1125)

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I

LIAO—A NEGLECTED BUT IMPORTANT PERIOD OF CHINESE HISTORY

AFTER THE BREAKDOWN OF THE GREAT T'ANG DYNASTY (618-906), continental East Asia saw the emergence of two major centers of political power. The greater part of China Proper was ruled first by a number of short-lived dynasties, and from 960 on, by the Sung state. The northeastern regions of the former T'ang territory and vast stretches of Inner Asia, including the greater part of modern Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, were comprised within the empire of Liao. After a series of struggles with the various dynasties that had successively gained control over China proper, the Liao Empire maintained itself as "the northern court" until the beginning of the twelfth century.

Scholars, both Chinese and non-Chinese, have studied the political and cultural history of the Sung dynasty in considerable detail. Little attention, however, has been given to the contemporary developments in the Liao world. Liao society and culture, resulting as it did from the conquest of Northeastern China by a not-too-well-known tribal people, the Ch'i-tan, seemed to offer little of importance. Only recently has this attitude undergone a serious change. Against a background of war and territorial expansion, the mechanics of past conquests are arousing increasing interest.

Modern social science in general and modern anthropology in particular have given us new tools for studying the processes of culture change under long and intensive contact. An examination of the in-

* The present article is part of a study of the institutional and cultural history of the Liao period carried on by the Chinese History Project. The complete material includes translated texts and analysis, and will appear, under the title of *History of Chinese Society, Liao,* as Volume 46 of the *Transactions* of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia. A commercial edition will be issued by the Macmillan Company, New York. In the present paper, references are given mainly for direct quotations. Fuller documentation—which would have unnecessarily burdened this article—will be found in the above-mentioned volume.

stitutional history of the Liao period reveals a type of "acculturation"[1] that may well have far-reaching implications for other periods of conquest in China and elsewhere. Held together by ties of power and privilege, the Ch'i-tan rulers of the Liao empire, although strongly influenced by Chinese manners and mores, lost neither their national nor their cultural identity. They lived, rather, in a state of institutional symbiosis[2] with their Chinese subjects and neighbors, a symbiosis that affected different elements within the conquered and conquering groups in different degrees and in different ways.[3]

II

SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF LIAO RELIGION

Liao religion, like other aspects of Liao culture, was not simple or uniform, but complex. Excluding Confucianism, which is essentially a philosophy of political and personal behavior, and disregarding Taoism, which played an inconspicuous role in Liao society, two major bodies of religious concepts may be noted: the traditional beliefs of the Ch'i-tan people and Buddhism. In addition we find undeniable, if minor, evidence of two creeds which up to Liao times had exerted a not inconsiderable influence upon the religious history of Asia: Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity.

During the two hundred years of Liao rule, the tribal religion of the Ch'i-tan may conceivably have spread to certain non-Ch'i-tan tribes, which, either as allies or as subject peoples, shared the way of life and, in some part, the privileges of the Ch'i-tan nationals. But judging from the records, it exerted no substantial influence on the Chinese sector of the Liao empire.[4]

1. The concept of acculturation has a long history which need not concern us here. Recently a workable definition was suggested by three leading American anthropologists, R. Redfield, R. Linton, and M. J. Herskovits, in "A Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation," *American Anthropologist* 38 (1936), 149-152. Our analysis utilizes this definition along with certain elaborations and qualifications made, in the main, by the three authors of the Memorandum. See also *History of Chinese Society, Liao* (from now on abbreviated as *Liao*), p. 5.

2. See Ralph Linton, "The Process of Culture Transfer," in *Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes*, ed. by R. Linton (New York and London, 1940), p. 493.

3. *Liao, passim*, particularly pp. 191 ff.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

Buddhism, on the contrary, seems to have spread throughout the empire with noteworthy vigor. The severe persecutions visited on Buddhism by T'ang China were not repeated by the Liao dynasty. Certain minor restrictions were imposed when the exigencies of war required that measures be taken against persons who tried to avoid their military obligations by seeking the protection of Buddhist monasteries and temples. On the whole, however, Buddhism flourished brightly and peacefully in the Chinese territories of Liao. The extent of its influence on the ordinary Ch'i-tan tribesmen is difficult to define. Clear, however, is its influence on the Ch'i-tan ruling group. And equally clear is the fact that the growth of Buddhism did not destroy the traditional tribal religion even in this sector. Ch'i-tan "shamanism" continued to flourish alongside the newly adopted ideas of the great Indian religious leader.

A. The Tribal Religion

1. *Deities, spirits, and powers:*

The Ch'i-tan pantheon included many deities and spirits: the gods of Heaven, Earth, and Sun, the gods of Mu-yeh Mountain, and of Black Mountain, and the deities of the Deer and the White Horse. The God of Fire, perhaps the prototype of the sacred fire of the Mongols, received considerable attention during the winter. A God of War and a God of Metal are also mentioned in the descriptions of ancient Ch'i-tan ceremonies in the official and unofficial works dealing with Liao history and culture.[5]

Besides such personified deities, many supernatural powers, not too clearly defined, were thought to be immanent in banners and drums, in trees and mountains, and in other natural phenomena. Included also in the supernatural world of the Ch'i-tan were the endless legions of the souls of the dead. The spirits of the two tribal ancestors and those of the imperial clan were appealed to at the temple seats. The souls of the general populace were protected by the god of the sacred Black Mountains.

The texts contain no explicit descriptions of the hereafter, but the clothes, weapons, saddles, and riding animals sacrificed at the funerals of the Ch'i-tan rulers would seem to imply a life after death with

5. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

definite pastoral and militant features. A century after the Liao dynasty collapsed, Carpini found that the tribal "Tartars" believed in a future world where their livestock would multiply, and where they themselves would eat, drink, and "do other things which living men perform here upon earth."[6]

Chinese observers during the Five Dynasties (907-960) were impressed by the prominent position given to the sun. The Ch'i-tan worshipped it on the first day of every month. The emperor also made a special sacrifice to this important deity, omitting, however, any recognition of the moon, which formed part of the Chinese ceremonial system. The Ch'i-tan reverence for the sun seemed so extraordinary to the Chinese that they spoke of their northern neighbors as the "Sun Ch'i-tan." They worshipped the sun at the winter solstice and again on such occasions as the ceremonial hunt, mobilization for war, and the ceremonial "recognition" of the ruler.[7]

Equally conspicuous in the Ch'i-tan religion were the two other great cosmic principles, Heaven and Earth. Usually they were appealed to together and particularly in times of rebellion, war, and death.

2. *Treatment of the supernatural powers:*

Most frequently natural phenomena were thought of as activated by specific spirits or deities. To live safely in a world influenced by gods, spirits, and impersonal powers, both good and bad, man had to secure the support of those supernaturals who were potentially friendly, and he had to ward off the real or possible dangers from those who were less well disposed.

Solemn announcements were made to the great gods of Heaven, Earth, and Sun, sometimes with the aid of fire, sometimes from a mountain top. To win the favor of their gods, the Ch'i-tan sacrificed horses and oxen, sheep and geese. Wine was poured upon the ground, and prayers were an integral part of substantial offerings in return for which substantial favors were expected.

Twice a year the two great tribal ancestors were officially honored by the sacrifice of a horse and an ox. On the fifteenth day of the tenth

6. "The Journey of Friar John of Pian de Carpini to the Court of Kuyuk Khan, 1245-1247, as Narrated by Himself," in *Contemporaries of Marco Polo,* ed. by Manuel Komroff (New York, 1928), p. 11.

7. *Liao,* pp. 214 ff.

month the spirits of all dead ancestors were worshipped, although offerings were also rendered to them at other times. Moreover, appeals were made to the imperial ancestors on important political occasions, such as the investiture of a new ruler or the commencement of a war.

At the funeral ceremonies of Ch'i-tan emperors, humans were sacrificed and saddle horses, saddles, clothes, and other objects burned. No doubt the live sacrifices supplied the dead with fit companions and servitors, and the destroyed property assured them a comfortable further existence.

Supernatural power was invoked by sympathetic magic, imitation, and contact. Through these means, such ambivalent agents as rain and vegetation were influenced, evil spirits paralyzed, and the political strength of the ruler maintained.

Rainfall was induced by asperging individuals, by standing in water, or by shooting at willow trees. Evil spirits were fought by roasting moles. Sleeping tents were protected by a sacrifice of white dogs. "Devil arrows" were shot at prisoners who served as substitutes for enemies still at large. At the New Year, evil spirits were intimidated by bells and arrows, singing and shouting. At an imperial funeral they were fought off with prayers. Fertility was believed to be transferable. A bride might wishfully offer a silver jar and warp spacer to a woman of proven motherhood.

Elaborate ceremonies established the position of the emperor. A magical repetition of his physical and political birth recapitulated the original scene so realistically that the presence of a ceremonial midwife and child were necessary in the rebirth rite. The "nine tents" (of previous rulers) and the "tenth tent" of the new emperor were erected in the Recognition Ceremony.

Divination was frequently resorted to. When a military expedition was contemplated, a shoulder blade of a white sheep was exposed to the heat of a fire kindled with mugwort and horse manure. If the bone cracked, the Ch'i-tan went to war; if not, peace remained the order of the day.

3. *Religious functionaries:*

Relations between man and the supernaturals rested in the hands of tribal priests or shamans and certain other persons who exercised political as well as religious power. First among these last was the em-

peror, who obviously perpetuated the religious duties of the Ch'i-tan chieftains. In time of war or during a ceremonial hunt, it was he who dealt with the gods. It was he who paid reverence to the sun and invoked the rain magic.

Certain other religious functionaries of manifestly tribal provenience performed ceremonial acts that continued practices of predynastic times. The *i-li-pi* directed the ceremonial participants; the *i-la* of the banners and drums slaughtered the animals for the great sacrifice to Mu-yeh Mountain; the *ti-lieh-ma-tu,* in charge of ritual etiquette, offered the sacrifices to Mu-yeh Mountain.

Besides these public functionaries, Liao society supported a number of professional seers and soothsayers, exorcists and physicians, the *wu.* This term, still current today, was used to designate "priests" in ancient China. During the Shang dynasty, the *wu* were highly esteemed, and the Shang king danced with them for rain. With the passing of the centuries, the separation of powers already noticeable in Shang times became increasingly marked. The growing political centralization which gave the key positions of magic control to the ruler and his secular officials reduced the functions and powers of the *wu.* In the course of a long and dramatic struggle, the *wu* priests became merely the guardians of a subsidiary and not always tolerated religion.

The tribal conquerors of China, however, held the primitive priesthood in greater respect. Even the highly assimilated Manchus, while officially accepting Chinese mores, continued to use shamans in their private religious ceremonies. In the Liao dynasty, the *wu* addressed the God of Fire at the year's end; they fought off evil spirits with shouts, bells, and arrows; they offered wine, millet, and prayers to aid the growth of newly planted willow trees; they assisted at times of war and death. At the Rebirth Ceremony, the head shaman covered the emperor's head and offered him presents; during the sacrifice to Mu-yeh Mountain he poured wine on the animal sacrifices.

No clear distinction can be drawn between what a people, such as the Ch'i-tan, considered extraordinary and "wonderful," and what seemed ordinary and matter-of-fact. But even if the borderline is none too definite, it is nevertheless real. Certain ceremonies, such as the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, and to the Sun, were patently religious, however secular their setting. Conversely, many customs and ceremonies, such as those of investiture and political rebirth, or girl steal-

ing, were primarily secular, despite the presence of religious elements. Finally, it should be noted that the interweaving of Ch'i-tan and Chinese features in this complex of Liao ceremonial and religion, makes an equally intriguing story, a story that unfortunately for lack of space, cannot be included here.

B. Liao Buddhism

Liao Buddhism is barely mentioned in the Western histories of the creed. This is a serious omission, for it was under the Liao dynasty that Buddhism emerged conspicuously in the vast eastern expanses of Inner Asia. By the end of the ninth century Chinese Buddhism had experienced both prosperity and decline. From the Middle Kingdom the doctrine had spread to the northeastern regions, to Korea and Japan, and to the Po-hai. In Tibet it took a peculiar ("lamaistic") form, and after a period of severe persecution in the later part of the T'ang dynasty, it flourished again, acquiring new strength during the Liao period. In a great part of Turkestan, Buddhism had spread hundreds of years before the T'ang dynasty. In Kao-ch'ang in Eastern Turkestan, Buddhist temples received their names from the T'ang government; the Ying-yün T'ai-ning Temple was erected in A.D. 640. Thus a huge semicircle of countries where Buddhist influence was important—Japan, Korea, Po-hai, China, Tibet, and Turkestan—fringed the pastoral regions of what is now northwestern Manchuria and Outer and Inner Mongolia.

1. *The spread of the creed:*

There is no detailed information regarding the religious situation in this vast region at the end of the ninth century. It seems, however, that Buddhism, which in China Proper recovered from the severe persecutions of 845, spread rapidly to the northern grasslands when the T'ang government collapsed. In 902 the Ch'i-tan built what may have been their first major Buddhist temple, "The Commencement of Teaching." Probably its erection was preceded by a period of ideological penetration. A-pao-chi's courtiers, who in 916 unanimously declared themselves in favor of Buddha, obviously were already indoctrinated. But, whatever Buddhist elements existed along with the old tribal religion during the predynastic period, the establishment of

a powerful empire certainly paved the way for the rapid spread of the creed. The new government could mobilize many skilled workmen to build temples and monasteries. It could also appropriate large surpluses of food for the use of the temples' monks and retainers.

A-pao-chi justified his usurption of the throne in terms of Chinese political customs, and his eldest son, Pei, naturally favored Confucianism, with its implied hereditary rule and succession. But even the first Liao emperor built Buddhist temples and encouraged his family to visit them. He himself honored the An-kuo Temple with his presence and offered food to Buddhist monks. His successors, firmly entrenched in their imperial position, continued to pay lip-service to Confucianism; but within the Ch'i-tan world only a limited group favored this doctrine whose anti-barbarian overtones were still resented by the northern nobility in the subsequent Chin period (1115-1234).

The Liao rulers, despite a partially Chinese education, remained emotionally tied to the ideas of their nomadic forefathers. They were eager to clothe their new imperial experience in the garments of the new "imperial" religion; but this new religion had to be compatible with old tribal beliefs which they did not intend to discard. Cherished tribal traditions might themselves be reasserted in new and significant ways, but since the new ideas had to be congenial emotionally as well as intellectually, they could not embody the sophisticated "learning" of Confucianism. The new demand was ideally satisfied by Buddhism. In its northern, Māhāyāna, form Buddhism offered its followers metaphysical ideas, complex and difficult in some respects, yet attractive because of the power and simplicity of the basic vision. It therefore appealed to the mounted Ch'i-tan rulers who were pushing their domain farther and farther along an increasingly glorious, if increasingly dangerous, road to conquest and dynastic rule.

The Ch'i-tan had been in contact with Chinese life and thus with Chinese Buddhism for centuries before 907. By the seizure of Chinese subjects, cities, and territories, they incorporated into their empire numerous Buddhist inscriptions written either in Sanskrit or in Chinese. Demiéville claims that the Liao edition of the Canon, which differs in arrangement from the Sung and the Korean texts, resembles the one used in China Proper between 930 and 940. He concludes that, in

all probability, the Ch'i-tan received the Buddhist Canon either from the Later T'ang or Later Chin dynasty.[8]

The Chinese root of Liao Buddhism is beyond doubt. It is confirmed by the recent discovery in old Liao sites of many Buddhist structures definitely Chinese in character. However, also beyond doubt is the decay of T'ang and post-T'ang Buddhism. The deterioration of the Canon under the Sung dynasty indicated the gradual loss of the creed's prestige and importance.

Was Liao Buddhism influenced by any other impulse? In the Uighur countries of Central Asia the religion flourished side by side with Manichaeism and Nestorianism; in 966 two hundred Uighurs appeared in the Liao border region of Shuo-fang in the company of sixty Chinese monks who were on their way to India; a Chinese delegation, visiting Kao-ch'ang in 981, observed that the Uighurs possessed the Buddhist Canon; and the *Liao Shih* also gives the life story of a high official, Hai-li, a believing Buddhist of Uighur descent.[9] We do not know whether his forefather who lived in the time of T'ai-tsu was a Buddhist. But there is clear evidence that a century later religious elements flowed from the Uighurs and, still later, from their neighbors, the Hsi Hsia, to the Liao court. In 1001 "the Uighurs [the country is not specified] presented Fan [Manichaean?] monks."[10] In 1067 the kingdom of Hsi Hsia offered a Sanskrit sūtra and golden Buddhas together with "Uighur monks."[11] Another Buddhist sūtra, this time an original manuscript, arrived from Hsi Hsia in 1095.[12]

In all three cases the Liao rulers were on the receiving end of the culture transfer. They participated more actively when their eastern neighbor, Korea, was concerned. A set of the newly printed Liao Canon was presented to the King of Korea in 1063; another set fol-

8. Paul Demiéville, "Les Versions chinoises du Milindapañha," *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française de l'Extrême-Orient* 24 (1925), 211.

The Later T'ang and the Later Chin dynasties, two of the so-called Five Dynasties, ruled over the greater part of China during the interval from the end of the T'ang (906) to the beginning of the Sung dynasty (960). The dates of these two short-lived dynasties are respectively 923-936 and 936-947.

9. *Liao Shih*, 97/1*b* ff. The edition of the *Liao Shih*, the *History of the Liao Dynasty*, quoted is the Po-na, a modern publication, combining fragments of several incomplete early (Yüan) texts.

10. *Ibid.*, 70/10*b*.

11. *Ibid.*, 22/5*a*.

12. *Ibid.*, 26/2*a*.

lowed in 1073. In return Korea also offered Buddhist texts, which Tao-tsung ordered revised and published in 1083. The superiority of the Liao texts as compared with the Sung editions was so striking that even Sung scholars had to acknowledge it. It was the Liao Buddhists who "established the first critical edition of the Canon."[13] Their work was carried on by Korean and, much later, by Japanese scholars. In contrast, in China Proper "each new edition was more mediocre than the last; this reached such a point that the edition in the Manchu dynasty was ignored by the scholars."[14]

2. *The position of Buddhism in Liao society:*

Literary records and contemporary inscriptions confirm the importance of Buddhism to the masters of Liao. The son of the first emperor, who later succeeded him, showed great devotion to the creed. Another emperor, Shêng-tsung, accepted the five great Buddhist commandments and organized a discussion of Buddhist doctrines. Another, Tao-tsung, composed and copied Buddhist texts with his own hand.

Buddhist ceremonies marked military victories and mourning at the death of an empress. Animals were treated with greater kindness; birds were released; even the slaughter of animals for meat was temporarily suspended. The celebration of Buddha's birthday was included in the list of national festivals, a list which does not mention the birthday of Confucius. Buddhist scriptures were used in educating the heir apparent. Buddhist altars were set up throughout the country, even in the Inner Hall, where the visits of fortune-telling Buddhist monks and nuns became so frequent that Emperor Tao-tsung, himself a firm believer, was compelled to interfere, no doubt because of the excessive emoluments offered them.

In 991 and 997 Buddhist monks and nuns had become so numerous that membership in the organization was restricted. Both the increase in adherents and the governmental counter-measures were probably inspired by the war against the Sung empire, just as similar regulations in 1015, and perhaps the order of 1020 against self-mutilation may have been caused by the exigencies of the conflict with Korea. Yet when imperial power was stabilized, the power of Buddhism was stabilized also. Monks were appointed to high honorary positions; a

13. Demiéville, *op. cit.*, p. 212.
14. *Ibid.*

clerical dignitary was allowed to ride in an imperial carriage. Even in the hour of decay, when the government had to mobilize all its manpower, it still admonished the Buddhist monks and nuns not to break their vows.

3. *The economic aspect:*

Parallel to its rising influence in the religious life was the increasing importance of Buddhism in Liao economy. The temple property of Liao derived from the devotion and generosity of its believers, who included the most powerful and wealthy elements in the empire. The reservoir of the temples' economic strength was, therefore, almost unlimited. In 902, when the Temple of the Commencement of Teaching was set up, the new religion may not have possessed great worldly wealth, but at the close of the dynasty, the property of the Buddhist temples can only have been matched by the wealth of the two ruling clans and, perhaps, some few other families.

How did this come about? The literary texts throw little light on the economic aspects of Liao Buddhism. Contemporary inscriptions, fortunately, are more revealing. The pride of donors and the gratitude of lavishly endowed temples have led to the tabulation of some of these gifts, which consisted of money, land, grain, cattle, bondsmen, and other miscellaneous items. Other inscriptions note Buddhist possessions without naming their source. An inscription of 1056 records the ownership of ten thousand *mou* of land and more than two thousand fruit trees by the Ch'ao-hua Temple. An inscription of 1107 refers to the three hundred Buddhist monks of Kan-hua Temple as owners of more than ten thousand *mou* of good land and more than ten thousand chestnut trees. In addition, the Kan-hua Temple owned three thousand *mou* of land, of which a thousand *mou* were sown in wheat.

These data present no complete picture, but they give some indication of the kind and amount of wealth amassed by the temples. Besides possessing great tracts of land and large sums of money, they had control over considerable numbers of people. The inscriptions refer to donated families that evidently lived in a state of bondage. Above and beyond the enslaved families were the free monks and nuns. According to the texts, their numbers swelled beyond belief: 50,000 monks and nuns were listed for the year 942, but in 1078, one hundred and thirty-six years later, 360,000 are mentioned.

It was usual for tribal believers to select the eldest son for the priesthood. Among the later Mongols, most lamas lived at home still participating in the affairs of their families, but exempted from military service. The records do not state whether the monks of Liao were also exempted from military service and the payment of taxes. It may, however, be assumed that the majority stayed with their families and pursued their regular occupations, while their position remained somewhat privileged.

The priestly status must have been highly attractive, for otherwise it would be difficult to explain the collective conversions of thousands of individuals or an order of several hundred thousand members. The nature of the privileges enjoyed by the monks can only be conjectured. Since the temples tried to remove their secular retainers from the public registers used in imposing taxes and labor service, they probably sought similar means of exempting their religious followers. They set up granaries for the benefit of the poor; they established charity schools; they lent out grain and money at a nominal rate of interest. The monk who gave alms to more than two million people must have subsidized whole districts, and that several times over. The story seems barely credible. It was probably exaggerated to emphasize the temple's unusual generosity.

These benefactions were counterbalanced by economic enterprises far from charitable. Kan-hua Temple leased its fertile wheat land to tenants; the Lung-kung Temple enslaved its tenants and treated them cruelly. The story that tells of the five hundred strings lent out annually at only one per cent interest by the Chin-yang Temple can be matched by the report that the pawnshop of the Shang-fang Temple earned more than a thousand strings of money yearly. The latter seems to have been the more typical procedure. A Chinese traveler, Su Ch'ê, in his report to the Sung court, describes the situation in the Liao empire as follows: "Temples are being built everywhere and monks are very numerous. The monks indulge in licentiousness. They lend money at exorbitant interest and plunder the common people, who have become very desperate."[15]

To be sure, the possible prejudice and exaggeration in all Chin and Sung sources must not be lost sight of. The monasteries and temples certainly engaged in charitable activities, and the excesses

15. Su Ch'ê, *Luan-ch'êng Chi*, 41/14*a-b*. (Ssu-pu Ts'ung-k'an edition).

may not have been as flagrant as the report suggests. But, in general, it confirms our other information too well to be lightly dismissed. Whatever their spiritual influence may have been, from an economic standpoint, the temples were the centers of a growing accumulation of wealth which led to serious social and political consequences.

The extraordinary growth of Liao Buddhism was approved and consciously fostered by the rulers of the country. They made enormous gifts to the temples. They permitted the monks to become "very numerous," and thousands accepted the commandments in a single region and at one time. They provided meals in honor of the Buddhist clergy, following an old established custom. But the outlay was greater than in any previous dispensation made in China Proper or Japan. Vegetarian meals were offered in Southern Sung to an unspecified number of Buddhist monks. The Japanese court entertained numerous Buddhist priests and nuns as shown by the following data:

10,000 priests in 752
1,000 priests in 756
1,500 monks in 756
600 priests in 767
296 nuns and girls in 773
1,049 men of all kinds in 773[16]

But, impressive as these figures are, they cannot be compared with the 50,000 and 360,000 monks and nuns who are said to have been fed by two of the Liao emperors respectively at the monster entertainments in the years 942 and 1078.[17]

C. The Minor Religions

(Islam, Manichaeism, Nestorian Christianity)

The *Liao Shih,* which is so articulate on the development of Buddhism in the Liao empire, has little if anything to say on other contemporary religions such as Islam, Christianity, or Manichaeism. During the tenth and eleventh centuries, Mohammedanism advanced impressively in Central Asia, converting not only large sections of the urban population but also many nomadic groups, among them the

16. M. W. de Visser, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan* II (Leiden, 1935), 28-41.
17. *Liao Shih,* 4, 8*b* and 23/6*b*.

Qarā-Khānids around 960, the Saljūqids before 1043, and other Turkic tribes in 960 and 1043. The Moslem creed spread primarily because of the growing political power of Islam. It is, therefore, understandable that it did not conspicuously affect the mighty and independent Liao world.

The history of Manichaeism and Nestorianism is very different. In 845, shortly after the collapse of the Buddhist-Manichaean Uighur empire, the T'ang government outlawed Buddhism and Manichaeism, and along with them, Nestorian Christianity, which had been tolerated in China from 635 on. Buddhism weathered the storm most successfully. Manichaeism was forced to resort to a kind of camouflage in order to carry on. But, in regions which lay beyond the reach of Chinese power, no special precautions or disguises were necessary. The Uighurs, who lost their empire between 840 and 843, did not disappear from the political scene. Having embraced Manichaeism in 763 and Buddhism in 778-779, they continued to practise both religions even after the year of their final collapse. A century later, the importance of Manichaeism among the Uighurs was still emphasized, and in the earlier part of the eleventh century, Al-Bīrūnī claimed that "most of the Hindus adhere still to his [Mani's] law and doctrine."[18] The statement is obviously an exaggeration, the author, like certain other Islamic writers, having failed to draw a clear distinction between Manichaeism and Buddhism. But his observation on the spread of the Persian creed among the "Eastern Turks" appears correct, especially where it concerns the Uighurs.

Nestorian Christianity was more adversely affected by the T'ang decree than were Buddhism or Manichaeism. In 987 a Christian monk, after his return from the Far East, reported in Constantinople that "the Christians of China had disappeared and perished for various reasons, and that in the whole country only one was left."[19] To be sure, some fragments survived north of China, but the second wave of Christian expansion did not get started until the eleventh century:

18. *The Chronology of Ancient Nations, an English Version of the Arabic Text of the Athār-ul-Bakiya of Albīrūnī,* collected and reduced to writing by the author in A. H. 390-1, A. D. 1000. Tr. and ed. with notes and index by Dr. Edward Sachau (London, 1879), p. 191.

19. Kitab al-Fihrist = Gabriel Ferrand, *Relations de Voyages et Textes Géographiques Arabes, Persans et Turks Relatifs à l'Extrême-Orient du VIII^e au XVIII^e Siècles* (Paris, 1913), p. 129.

in 1007, according to Bar Hebraeus, the Keraits south of Lake Baikal adopted Nestorianism.[20]

1. *Manichaeism:*

When the Liao government took over the northeastern territories of the former T'ang empire, it had no interest in implementing the severe edict of 845. As we have indicated, Buddhism enjoyed supreme favor at the "northern court." Manichaeism and Christianity seem to have been tolerated, although neither attained major importance. Concrete and incontrovertible evidence of Liao Manichaeism is scanty. According to a Uighur document recently discovered in Qarā-Khōdja (ancient Kao-ch'ang), a Manichaean *auditor* returned to Central Asia with a Manichaean text from "Chitai." Unfortunately the attached note, written by the *auditor* and dated by Chavannes and Pelliot "des environs de l'an 1000," yields no significant data on the Manichaean's experiences in "Chitai"; it merely states that he recited the text twice after returning from that country.[21]

Another bit of not too satisfactory evidence has been adduced by Ch'ên Yüan from the statement that, in 1001, the Uighurs sent a *fan sêng* to Liao. Usually in Buddhist writings the term *fan* designates a Brahman, a *fan sêng* being "a monk from India, or more generally, a monk who maintains his purity."[22] Because of the importance of Manichaeism in Uighur society, Ch'ên Yüan considers it probable that the monks on this mission were Manichaeans.[23]

Also of interest is an inscription made during the Chin dynasty which discusses heretic religious trends developed under the guise of

20. Bar Hebraeus Chron. Eccles. = Lawrence E. Browne, *The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia from the Time of Muhammad till the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1933), p. 129. Cf. W. Barthold, *Zur Geschichte des Christentums in Mittelasien* (Tübingen and Leipzig, 1901), p. 51; Paul Pelliot, "Chrétiens d'Asie Centrale et d'Extrême-Orient," *T'oung Pao*, 15 (1914), 627.

21. Albert von Le Coq, "Türkische Manichaica aus Chotscho," *Abhandlungen der [Königlichen] Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Philologisch-Historische Klasse*, Anhang, Nr. VI (1911), 29. For the dating see "Edouard Chavannes et P. Pelliot, Un Traité Manichéen retrouvé en Chine." *Journal Asiatique* I (1913), 141.

22. William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms* (London, 1937), p. 353.

23. Ch'ên Yüan, "Mo-ni Chiao Ju Chung-kuo K'ao (History of Manichaeism in China)," *Kuo-hsüeh Chi-k'an (Journal of Sinological Studies)*, National University of Peking, I (1923), 225.

Buddhism at the close of the T'ang period and during the Liao and Sung dynasties. According to this inscription, the heretics prefer *wu hsin* (no desire) to fasting, *wu yen* (no words) to the expounding of texts, and *wu wei* (no action) to the exalting of pagodas and temples.[24] The Three Seals—abstention from evil thoughts, works, and deeds—are fundamental in the Manichaean ethical code, and since Manichaeism developed from a synthesis of ancient Persian ideas with elements of Buddhism, Christianity, and Gnosticism,[25] it may well have continued to be receptive to syncretistic adjustments. It is, therefore, not at all impossible that the remnants of Manichaeism which survived in the Liao empire were gradually associated and merged with the country's dominant religion, Buddhism.

2. *Nestorianism:*

Both archaeology and the written records testify to a knowledge of Nestorian Christianity in the Liao empire, but the combined evidence is so scanty that not even a guess on this religion's role and significance seems warranted. West of Fang-shan, some forty miles southwest of Peiping, is the Buddhist "Temple of the Cross" which, sometime around 1896, was included by a Chinese official in a list of antiquities. From 1919 on, this temple attracted international attention, for it contained two crosses carved on stone, similar to the cross appearing at the top of the famous Nestorian tablet of 781 in Hsi-an. One of the Fang-shan crosses bears, in Syrian, the words: "Look ye unto it and hope in it" (Psalm 34:5). Also preserved in the temple are two inscribed tablets, one Liao and the other Yüan.[26] The former, dated 960, ascribes the erection of two stone *ch'uang* (pillars) to Chin and T'ang times. These *ch'uang* are generally identified as the stones on which the crosses appear. While the presence of these crosses is no sure index of the strength of Christianity in the Liao empire, they certainly indicate a tolerant attitude toward an unmistakably Christian symbol.

Crosses have also been discovered in other parts of the old Liao territory, and, with varying degrees of certainty, they have been as-

24. Lo Fu-i, *Man-chou Chin-shih Chih Wai-pien*, 40*b*. Man Jih Wên-hua Hsieh-hui ed., 1937.

25. A. V. Williams Jackson, *Researches in Manichaeism* (New York, 1932), p. 7.

26. The Yüan (Mongol) dynasty dated from 1206. It fell in 1368.

signed to the Liao period: The seven crosses of Shih-chu-tzu-liang in Inner Mongolia stand in a cemetery which also yielded Liao coins dated Shêng-tsung;[27] in the ruins of an old northern Liao city on the T'ao-êrh River, a metal cross was found in 1927; a number of large earthen crosses appeared in some recently investigated Liao tombs in Liao-yang; and additional crosses have been found by Torii in various other Liao sites.[28]

Particularly interesting is a sculptured stone discovered at the Ch'ien-shan station near An-shan in a tomb at the foot of Mt. An, from which it was later removed. Dr. Torii considers it a Ch'i-tan work which "represents, I think, the birth of Christ in the manger of a stable at Bethlehem."[29] The Japanese archaeologist describes and interprets his find as follows:

> In the scene incised on it, is the entrance to a building in which is a squarish cradle and in it is a small baby from whose head radiate three lines. . . . The man in the center wears a hood on his head, a tight sleeved long gown, with a stand-up collar, and a belt with a square buckle either of stone or of gold. On his feet he wears leather shoes. With hands hidden in his sleeves he looks up at the baby in the cradle. The head of the man on the left side is uncovered. He wears a tight-sleeved long gown, a belt around his waist, and a shawl over the shoulders, and hides his two hands in his sleeves. The man on the right squats on a square mat (?), he wears a hood on the head and a tight-sleeved long gown with a stand-up collar, and holds a long and slightly crooked object in his arms.

For Torii "it is beyond all doubt that the scene belongs to Christianity." In his opinion, it depicts the three wise men from the East who, bearing gifts, come to do homage to the Christ child. He notes the absence of the Virgin Mary, but this does not shake his interpretation. He is convinced that this incised picture was inspired by "a particular branch of Christianity, that is the so-called Nestorianism of *Ching Chiao* which was popular in the T'ang dynasty."[30]

A number of written records indicate either directly or by implica-

27. Charles Pieters, "Croix d'un ancien cimetière chrétien," *Bulletin Catholique de Pekin:* 54-56 (1924). Cf. A. C. Moule, *Christians in China Before the Year 1550* (London, New York, and Toronto, 1930), 74 ff. note 93. *Idem:* "The Use of the Cross among the Nestorians in China," *T'oung Pao* 28 (1931), p. 83.

28. Torii Ryūzō, *Ryō no bunka o saguru* (Tokyo, 1937), 344.

29. Torii Ryūzō, *Sculptured Stone Tombs of the Liao Dynasty* (Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1942), p. 59.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 59f.

tion, the Nestorian affiliations of certain individuals during the Liao period. The Yüan scholar, Huang Chin, traced the genealogy of his famous contemporary, Ma Tsu-ch'ang, to Ho-lu Mi-ssu, a scion of a distinguished Nestorian family who, in the eleventh century, came from the Western Regions to the Liao empire. Ho-lu Mi-ssu, whose name may originally have been Horam Michael, refused the official title offered him by Emperor Tao-tsung, but his son served as an officer in the Liao army. Furthermore, an inscription made in 987 in Chi County, northeast of modern Peiping, speaks of an abbot who belonged to "the Nestorian sect *(ching p'ai)* which is of foreign origin. Its god is unfathomable. Suffering which follows desire is brought to an end. Happiness is shared with others."[31] In 962, under this same abbot's direction, the temple was enlarged by the addition of a new hall which contained a single statue—that of Buddha.

3. *Syncretistic trends:*

The curious mixture of Nestorian and Buddhist elements revealed by this story is less bewildering if it is remembered that Nestorianism, as well as other religions of refuge including Manichaeism, exhibit syncretistic combinations of all kinds. The crosses found near Fang-shan rest on a lotus flower, that is, they appear in a typically Buddhist setting.

The separate elements blended together in Empress Ying-t'ien's dream of a god with a golden crown followed by twelve animals are difficult to identify. More detailed, and therefore more suggestive, are two dreams ascribed to the empress' second son. In the first, T'ai-tsung saw a god, handsome in appearance, wearing a chaplet, and attended by a ceremonial cortege. Suddenly this god, scepter in hand, descended from heaven, his white clothes held together by a golden belt. Twelve strange animals followed him, and one, a black hare, leaped into the emperor's bosom and disappeared. Addressing T'ai-tsung, the god said: "When Shih Ching-t'ang [the founder of the Later Chin dynasty][32] dispatches a messenger to call upon you, you must go!"

T'ai-tsung told his mother of his dream, and at first she gave it little attention, but when her son dreamed again of the same god, dressed

31. Miao Ch'üan-sun, *Liao Wên-ts'un*, 5/15*a*. (Lai-ch'ing-ko ed., preface dated 1896.)

32. See above, note 8.

the same way, and speaking the same words, she advised him to consult a *hu wu* (a *"hu"* shaman). *The hu wu,* after completing his divinations, declared: "T'ai-tsu on his return from the West Tower said, 'China is going to set up a heavenly king who needs your help. You must go.' " T'ai-tsung, thereupon, supported Shih Ching-t'ang in his fight against the tottering Later T'ang dynasty, urged to action not by worldly motives, but, so at least the record claims, by the Heavenly Lord's command. Some time later, on a visit to the seat of Yu Prefecture, T'ai-tsung identified an image of a Bodhisattva which he saw there with the god of his dreams. While their gowns differed in color, both wore the same headdress. The emperor, therefore, erected at Mu-yeh Mountain a Hall of Bodhisattva, P'u-sa T'ang.[33]

The *Liao Shih,* in a somewhat different version, which ascribes the dream to T'ai-tsu, states that the emperor had the Kuan-yin in the White Dress removed from Yu Prefecture to Mu-yeh Mountain, establishing it as his family deity to whom he announced his military plans and achievements.[34]

T'ai-tsung's two dreams end on an unmistakably Buddhist note. They contain, however, a number of features suggestive of other religious creeds. Nestorian Christianity, documented by archeological and literary evidence, may well have provided some elements in the miracle story: the scepter-bearing god, the non-Buddhist white gown, the twelve strange followers, the idea of a directing father. But it is equally probable, if not more so, that these features derived primarily from other sources. The father motif may be plausibly explained by Ch'i-tan or Chinese tradition. The possibility of Manichaean influence is suggested by the close connection between Ch'i-tan and Uighur civilizations. The color white, which had an honorific significance in Ch'i-tan tradition, was also favored by the Nestorians, but it assumed particular prominence among the Manichaeans who considered light the manifestation of the Supreme Being. White gowns and headdresses are documented for the Manichaeans both in Turfan and in China. Even in Sung China, where the adherents of the then outlawed creed are said to have changed the color of their garments, they still

33. Yeh Lung-li, *Ch'i-tan Kuo Chih* 2/6*a-b*. (Ssu-ch'ao Pieh-shih Sao-yeh-shan-fang ed.)

34. *Liao Shih,* 37/9*a-b;* 49/3*a*.

worshiped a "white Buddha," whom they identified with Mani.[35] The twelve animals, which also appeared in Ying-t'ien's dream, seem to have nothing in common with the twelve apostles except their number. However, the figure twelve is conspicuous in Mani's cosmology, having been derived from the "twelve hours"—that is, from the twelve signs of the zodiac.[36]

In the records dealing with the history of Manichaeism translated by Chavannes and Pelliot, the term *hu* has been rendered either as "Iranian" or "Soghdian." If this rendering is accepted, the *hu wu* of our story would have been a Central Asiatic priest. However, in other contemporary sources the word *hu* has the general connotation, "barbarian," or "tribal." The diviner consulted by the disturbed emperor was obviously not a Buddhist, but whether he was a Nestorian or a Manichaean cannot be determined.

D. Conclusion

The data used in our survey throw light on a period in the religious history of Asia which, until now, has received little attention in Western studies. They reveal the outlines of a significant shamanistic religion that flourished in Inner Asia centuries before Chingis Khan. They close a gap in our knowledge of Far Eastern Buddhism, enabling us to define more clearly this creed's development in the vast expanses of Turkestan, China, and Korea. The data also provide new evidence on the staying-power of what may be called one of Asia's "refugee religions," Manichaeism. And finally, they document the spread of Christianity, in its historically significant form, Nestorianism, to territories far to the north of China where, in the capital of the T'ang dynasty, the heretic sect had found a haven several centuries earlier.

35. Chavannes and Pelliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 333 ff.
36. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 192 ff.

MARIA STELLA MARIS

ALEXANDER H. KRAPPE*

SOME TEN YEARS AGO Maurice A. Canney examined anew the origin and genesis of the widely spread cult of Maria Stella Maris, the Blessed Virgin in her quality of protectress of sailors and sea faring folk generally.[1] In particular, he recalled the connection of her epithet with the etymology of *Miriam-Maria* as proposed by St. Jerome, who renders the name as "stella maris."[2]

It is beside the point to quarrel with St. Jerome and to question his Hebrew scholarship. His etymology may or may not be correct. It is highly doubtful that he was the first to hit upon it, and altogether improbable that a cult epithet which was to acquire such wide diffusion and great popularity should have originated in a simple etymology, no matter how well founded, proposed by a learned author in a work destined to the happy few. Even assuming that the etymology is incorrect and fanciful—and it may well be so—we have no right to alter St. Jerome's text arbitrarily and to make him say, on the basis of a ninth-century MS, *stilla maris,* "drop of the sea," and to draw from this far-fetched conclusions and inferences.[3] It would be a unique instance of a false reading having completely crowded out the correct one, acquiring an immense popularity, while the correct reading fell into a hopeless oblivion, being preserved in one late MS. Sound method would rather suggest, it would seem, a preliminary enquiry into the connection of the sea with a star in antiquity, since it holds out hope of giving further clues. What can this "star of the sea" be?

Hellenism, down to the time of St. Jerome, was familiar with a

*Since this article was accepted for publication in *The Review of Religion,* its author's name has been added to that tragically long list of scholars who have been cut off in their prime. The Editors wish to express here their deep regret for his loss. This is the third of Dr. Krappe's articles which we have been privileged to publish, the other two being "The Birth of Adonis" (November, 1941), and "Phaethon" (January, 1944).

1. Maurice A. Canney, "Stella Maris," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* CXV (1937), 90 ff.

2. Paul de Lagarde, *Onomastica sacra* (Göttingen, 1887), p. 41, 14.8.

3. Canney, *op. cit.,* pp. 90 f. The variant reading *stilla* was suggested, in the first place, by a fanciful etymology of the name *Mar-yam, mar* meaning "drop" in Hebrew. Canney's suggestion was anticipated by P. Haupt, *American Journ. of Sem. Lang. and Literatures,* XX (1904), 152.

hymn of Callimachus relating the following myth.[4] Asteria, a Titan, a daughter of Koios and Phoibe, a sister of Leto, flees from the embraces of Zeus by a bold leap through the atmosphere, like a shooting star, plunging into the sea, where she is transformed into the rocky island of Delos. According to a variant preserved by Hyginus (*fab.* 53), she was transformed by Zeus into a quail and precipitated into the sea, where she became an island known as Ortygia (i.e., Quail Island), which subsequently received the name of Delos.[5] In a third tradition it was Asteria herself who requested the transformation, but when she was about to swim across the sea in the shape of a quail, Zeus transformed her into a rock, which later became the island of Delos.[6]

Asteria's name is clearly connected with ἀστήρ ἄστρον (Skr. *stár,* Lat. *stella,* Goth. *stairnô,* O. N. *stjarna,* Hitt. *astiras*),[7] but quite apart from this etymology, a daughter of Koios and Phoibe, a granddaughter of Ouranos unquestionably represents also some celestial phenomenon, and most mythologists have frequently seen in her a personification of a meteorite falling from the sky and disappearing into the sea.[8] Asteria would thus appear to be a true "stella maris," one not only much older than Christianity, but older also than the Olympian religion of Greece, the Titans being, as is generally recognised, a divine dynasty anterior to the divinities of Homer.

We do not know the precise relation between Asteria and the ancient Aegean mother goddess. That the latter was connected with the sea is, however, quite certain.[9] It is, of course, not necessary that a meteorite plunge into the sea. At Aphaca, in Lebanon, at the annual feast of the goddess, Astarte appeared in the form of a fiery meteorite, which descended from the top of the mountain to plunge into the river.[10] According to Philo of Byblos, the great Semitic goddess was not outright identical with a meteorite: she merely found one after it

4. *Hymn. in Del.* 56 ff.; cf. Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos* (Berlin, 1924), II, 65.

5. Apollod. I. 4. 1; schol. Ap. Rhod. I. 308, 419; Tzetzes ad Lyc. 401; Lact. Plac. in Stat. *Theb.* IV. 795; *Script. rer. myth. Lat.* (ed. G. H. Bode), I, pp. 13, 79 f.

6. Serv. ad Verg. *Aen.* III. 73.

7. Weidner and Friedrich, *Archiv f. Orientforschung,* VI, 223.

8. Cf. Schirmer in Roscher's *Lexikon,* I (1), col. 656.

9. A. D. Nock, *Classical Review,* XXXIX (1925), 174, n. 1.

10. Sozomen, *Hist. eccles.* II. 4. 5.

had fallen from the sky and dedicated it at Tyre on the "holy island."[11] Nor is this the only example of a "fallen star" that dropped, not indeed into the sea, but on dry land, where it then received a divine cult. The Phoenician Astarte, like her Arabic pendants[12] and like the Anatolian Kybele,[13] was frequently worshipped in the form of a conical or cubical stone, which was believed to have been a "star" fallen from the sky.[14]

For a reason which is not wholly clear this "fallen" star was frequently identified with one of the aspects of the planet Venus, the morning star. Even when this planet was believed to be of the male sex, as happened in the case of the biblical Lucifer (Helal) and the Hellenic Phaëthon, there circulated myths recounting how it had fallen or had been precipitated from the sky into the sea.[15] We are thus led to conclude that the "stella maris" par excellence was the planet Venus and that, accordingly, the epithet was attached from the earliest times to whatever goddess was identified with this star, whether her name was Asteria, Astarte, as-Zuhra, or Aphrodite.

The Semitic documents in particular fully corroborate these findings. The goddess Asherath is regularly styled *Ašerath-yam,* "Asherath of the Sea," in the Canaanite myths from Ras Shamra-Ugarit, dating from the middle of the fifteenth century before our era.[16] The same divine figure was known in Egypt, where she is referred to as "Lady of the Ocean," but the occurrence of Semitic loan words in the cult title leaves no doubt about her Semitic origin.[17] The corresponding Hurrian goddess Išḫara (who was adopted into both the Hittite and Ugaritic pantheons), frequently identified with the Babylonian Ištar, is referred to as *Išḫara tiâmat,* "Išḫara of the Sea." She, too, is commonly identified with the planet Venus.[18]

11. Ed. Orelli, p. 36; Euseb., *Praep. evang.* I. 10. 21; cf. F. Lenormant, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* III (1881), 44.

12. A. H. Krappe, *Review of Religion,* VIII (1944), 119.

13. A. H. Sayce, *The Hittites,* 2nd ed. (London, s.d.), p. 113.

14. Krappe, *loc. cit.*

15. *Ibid.,* pp. 115 ff.

16. I owe this information, with many other references, to my friend, Dr. Theodor H. Gaster, of the Library of Congress. On the Canaaite goddess of the Sea cf. also W. F. Albright, *Journ. of the Palestine Oriental Society,* XII (1932), 10.

17. W. Spiegelberg, *Publ. Soc. Bibl. Arch.,* 1902, pp. 41 ff.

18. E. Schrader, *Die Keilschriften und das Alte Testament* (Berlin, 1903), p. 432. Cf. also J. Plessis, *Etude sur les textes concernant Istar-Astarté* (Paris, 1921), pp.

The next problem is to determine the raison d'être of these divine figures, their common denominator, and their common function. A look at the diffusion of the cults briefly reviewed will quickly furnish us with the necessary clue. The myths of Asteria are localized in the Aegean, strictly speaking, in its geographical center, the island of Delos. The stone of Astarte was worshipped on the "holy island" of Tyre, one of the great seafaring towns of Phoenicia. At Aphaca the divine meteorite descended into a navigable river, not far from the river mouth. Kybele was worshipped in the form of an aerolith at Ephesus, an active seaport throughout antiquity. All this points to the presumption that we are dealing with one and the same peculiar aspect of several (though closely related) Near Eastern goddesses, all fulfilling the same function, namely to protect sailors and sea-faring folk generally, to act as saviors *in periculo maris*.

That the morning star should have some such function is not difficult to understand; announcing the approach of daybreak in a stormy night, it may well fill storm-tossed mariners with renewed hope, as indeed the morning star has generally become a symbol of hope and of confidence in a better future.[19] But how a shooting star could convey such feelings is less easy to see, and we suspect that there is more to the matter. At this point the mediaeval tradition will help to fill the gap.

One of the numerous accounts of Mary, Star of the Sea, and the miracles performed by her to save sailors in dire peril reads as follows:[20] Overcome by a sudden storm in the British Ocean, the passengers of a vessel successively invoke their respective patron saints, St. Nicholas and St. Andrew. Then an abbot, head of a band of monks that happens to be on board, suggests that they pray to the Blessed Virgin. The suggestion is readily accepted. Then all of a sudden a light appears on the masthead, illuminating the darkness, and the storm ceases. The phenomenon referred to certainly is no shooting star, but the wellknown St. Elmo's fire, no less well known in antiquity, where it was attributed either to the Dioscuri or to their sister Helen, who is herself but a

75 ff. and 144; E. Dhorme, *Les religions de Babylonie et d'Assyrie* (Paris, 1945), pp. 89 f.

19. Cf. the beautiful Lutheran hymn, *Wie schön leuchtet der Morgenstern*, by Philip Nicolai.

20. A. Mussafia, "Studien zu den mittelalterlichen Marienlegenden," *Sitzungsber. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss., phil. hist. Cl.*, CXIII (1886), 941; H. Günter, *Die christliche Legende des Abendlandes* (Heidelberg, 1910), p. 45.

hypostasis of Aphrodite.[21] Now these lights are currently referred to as "stars" (ἀστέρες and ἄστρα) in Greek documents,[22] and Horace sang:

> Sic fratres Helenae lucida sidera
> Ventorumque regat pater, . . .
>
> (*Od.* I. 3. 2).

and

> Dicam et Alciden puerosque Ledae
> Hunc equis, illum superare pugnis
> Nobilem quorum simul alba nautis
> Stella refulsit
> Defluit saxis agitatus umor,
> Concidunt venti fugiuntque nubes
> Et minax, quod sic voluere, ponto
> Unda recumbit
>
> (*Od.* I. 12. 25).

The inference will then not appear far-fetched that in antiquity the great Mediterranean goddess, call her Asteria, Astarte, or Aphrodite-Helen, appeared to storm-tossed sailors in the same guise, the St. Elmo's fire, interpreted as a stellar phenomenon, settling on the mastheads of ships.[23] This conclusion is corroborated by evidence from an unexpected quarter. The Chinese, too, are familiar with the phenomenon, which they attribute to the goddess Ma-Chu. She manifests herself in the form of a ball of fire going up and down the mast: the latter is a favorable sign, the former not.[24]

Such a wide diffusion of these beliefs would in itself justify the inference that they are extremely old, as old, no doubt, as navigation. This conclusion is confirmed by certain prehistoric drawings, of Scandinavian origin, showing a ship with a star on either side of the mast,

21. Karl Jaisle, *Die Dioskuren als Retter zur See bei Griechen und Römern* (Tübingen, 1907), pp. 17 ff. It cannot be objected that in antiquity Helen was generally considered a bad omen (schol. Statius, *Theb.* VII. 791, Solinus, XVIII. 1); to the ancient Greeks the divine Twins were saviors *in periculo maris;* to the modern Greek sailors the same lights, whom they call *Telonia,* are of bad augury (W. W. Hyde, *Greek Religion and its Survivals* [Boston, 1923], p. 163).

22. L. von Schröder, *Arische Religion* (Leipzig, 1914-16), II, 451 f.

23. It is noteworthy that the Dioscuri, like our goddess, were identified not only with the St. Elmo's fire but also with the planet Venus in its two aspects.

24. A. Bastian, *Die Völker des östlichen Asien* (Jena, 1866-71), III, 249, n. 1.

or else the divine Twins in human form.[25] In other words, a universal phenomenon, the St. Elmo's fire, was interpreted in much the same way from the dawn of history, and a universal need—universal, that is, so far as navigation was known and practiced—everywhere created the same divine figures, a helpful pair of twin brethren or a divine lady. As is natural enough, the miracles of divine rescue at sea also recount much the same happenings, whether the goddess be Greek, Christian, or Chinese. A few illustrations must suffice:

Athenaeus (XV. 675) relates after the treatise of Polycharmus of Naucratis the following story:

> During the twenty-third Olympiad Herostratus, a citizen of our town engaged in trade, was voyaging far and wide when he landed once at Paphos, in Cyprus, and bought a statuette of Aphrodite nine inches high, of ancient workmanship; departing, he carried it to Naucratis. As he approached Egypt a storm suddenly broke upon him and it was impossible to see where in the world they were, so they all took refuge at the statue of Aphrodite, begging her to save them. The goddess, being friendly to the Naucratites, suddenly caused everything that lay beside her to be covered with fresh green myrtle, filling the ship with a most pleasant odour, when the men sailing in her were by this time despairing of their safety, for they were very seasick and there was much vomiting; then the sun shone forth, and they could see their anchorage, and so arrived in Naucratis.

Compare with this the miracle summarised by Mussafia:[26]

> A pagan lady requests her brother to bring her an image of Our Lady from the Holy Land. On the return voyage the ship is seized by a tempest. The pagan wants to throw the image into the sea, but the statue begins to speak, saying: "Spare me; I can help thee." The pagan desists, and the storm ceases. The image is given to the pagan lady.

A Chinese tradition belongs to the same type:[27]

> A Chinese fleet sailing for the Liu-Kiu Islands is caught in a tempest, and the crew despair of their safety. Suddenly a multitude of red lamps appear on the surface of the water. Then the sailors, who were praying in their cabins, were filled with new hope, "We shall live," they said, "the Holy Mother has come." In fact, the Queen of Heaven in person appeared, calming the wind and the waves, and the ships glided peacefully along their course.

In all these stories we have the same logical sequence of events:

25. H. Güntert, *Der arische Weltkönig und Heiland* (Halle, 1923), p. 275.
26. *Op. cit.*, CXV (1888), 89, No. 73.
27. Richard Wilhelm, *Chinesische Volksmärchen* (Jena, 1921), pp. 50 f.

storm at sea, invocation of the divinity, and her epiphany, usually in the form of a light (star) or lamps, sometimes accompanied by other phenomena (e.g., the myrtles of Aphrodite), with a sudden abatement of the tempest. It is clear that the only raison d'être of the divinity is her function, that the function created the goddess, in the ancient Mediterranean, in Christian Europe, and in the China Sea; but on the basis of the available evidence it would be as inadmissible to derive the figure of Maria Stella Maris from Isis (as has been proposed)[28] as it would be to derive her from the Chinese Ma-Chu.

It is different, however, with the epithet. Divine epithets have their history: they are rarely born with the divinity, and they rarely die with it; they are transferable. That Maria Stella Maris should owe her epithet to the etymology of St. Jerome is, as we have shown above, utterly unlikely. That she should have inherited it from an older divinity whose cult flourished among seafaring folk in the Eastern Mediterranean, and who was identified sometimes with the planet Venus, sometimes with a shooting star and aerolith plunging into thé sea, is logical and natural.

True enough, the school of historians, who have an eye only for details and who require a demonstration that leaves no gaps, will still find the evidence defective: where is the inscription calling Asteria, Astarte, or Aphrodite *Stella Maris?* But the historian who can discern:

> "How parts relate to parts, or they to whole,
> The body's harmony, the beaming soul,"

cannot fail to recognise the long, slow but continuous flow of historical phenomena, in the domain of religion as in pragmatic history, which is the very essence of all historical understanding.

28. Th. Trede, *Das Heidentum in der römischen Kirche* (Gotha, 1889-1891), III, 144 f.; W. Drexler, in Roscher's *Lexikon,* II (1), col. 428.

WORKS OF LOVE: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

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I

ONE OF THE OBJECTIONS which has been urged against contemporary dialectical theology is that its definition of love *(Agape)* makes Christianity inapplicable to earthly conditions. If pure love always exceeds our reach, then why not judge ourselves by some feasible goal instead of scolding ourselves for falling short of the impossible? And may not universal sinfulness—i.e., universal failure to do the impossible—easily be made into an excuse for failing to do what is quite within our powers? Kierkegaard's position in *Works of Love* represents an interesting blend of the two opposing points of view. He contrasts *Agape* sharply with the temporal goals of the natural man, but he also holds that it is achievable in this world by anyone who is willing to pay the price.

The book, which was finished in August 1847 and published the following year, is divided into two parts; the first contains five discourses and the second ten. As anyone familiar with Kierkegaard will expect, it concentrates upon *individual* ethical and religious concerns and ignores the bearing of Christian ethics upon economic, political and social problems. This staggering omission cannot be forgotten; yet, in spite of it, the volume contains some of the most penetrating studies on Christian love to be found in any literature.

The author's first concern is to distinguish the reality of love, which is inward, from the external appearances of it, which are apt to be deceiving. Selfish possessiveness, weak complacency, and flattery may easily look like love. Genuine and false love may even be expressed

* *Works of Love*. By SOREN KIEREGAARD. Translated by David F. and Lillian M Swenson, with an introduction by Douglas V. Steere. Princeton University Press, 1946. xiv, 317 pp. $3.75.

For Self-Examination and *Judge for Yourselves!* By SOREN KIEREGAARD. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton University Press, 1944. vii, 243 pp. $2.50.

Attack upon "Christendom." By SOREN KIEREGAARD. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton University Press, 1944. xviii, 303 pp. $2.50.

A Kierkegaard Anthology. Edited by ROBERT BRETALL. Princeton University Press, 1946. xxv, 487 pp. $5.00.

through the same phrases and similar deeds; the difference depends upon an intention which is hidden from observers, but not hidden from the heart. Therefore the task of discrimination involves looking inwardly upon oneself instead of trying to make shrewd judgments about others.

In the second discourse, Kierkegaard establishes on a Christian basis a thesis which Erich Fromm attempts to elaborate on a humanistic basis in his brilliant essay "Selfishness and Self-love."[1] Kierkegaard was exactly a century ahead of Fromm in insisting that love for mankind (the neighbor) is conjunctive with self-love, which is the opposite of selfishness; both agree that much of the feverish busyness, unhappiness, and rigid conscientiousness of the human race is due to lack of self-love; but then the former goes on to show that all forms of earthly love and friendship have a really selfish element in them. The essential difference between the two writers arises from the fact that one sees love-for-self-and-neighbor as grounded in natural capacities *(Eros)*, while the other sees the human capacity as grounded in God *(Agape)*. According to Kierkegaard, *Eros* can always be turned into hatred, jealousy, or despair because it is dependent upon temporal objects outside itself; it must either feed on reciprocation or turn into defiant aloofness; and in the face of bereavement it is helpless. *Agape* is genuinely independent, because its inward ground is eternal and free from possessiveness; this independence enables it to rise above all accidental circumstances (such as what others do or what fortune brings) without becoming aloof. Furthermore, Kierkegaard sees *Eros* and *Agape* as opposed, because the former is directed preferentially toward loved ones and friends, while the latter is directed unconditionally toward all men. This is not the place to adjudicate the dispute, but it is not too much to say that Dr. Fromm would have to read the "empirical evidence" somewhat selectively in order to maintain that love for all men is "natural" to Homo sapiens.

Kierkegaard explicitly denies that *Agape* is opposed to earthly love merely because the latter is sensual; the opposition arises, rather, because *Eros* is "partial," is influenced by distinctions of status, education and class, and is therefore incompatible with real equality. Christianity, he continues, does not ignore such distinctions, but it insists that all narrower loyalties shall be subordinated to the inclusive one of

1. *Man for Himself* (New York and Toronto, 1947), pp. 119 ff.

love for the neighbor (mankind). This brings it into conflict with man's natural selfishness as manifested in symbiotic sexual relations, in prejudiced favoritism toward his own social group, etc. Christianity is continually charged with being impractical, because adjustment to the existing pattern with all its animosities is undeniably *easier*. But Christianity is not escapist. Actually, the one who runs away from the fact of our common humanity, as grounded in God, and succumbs to the pressures of the cultural pattern is the escapist.

The next problem which Kierkegaard discusses is also a central one for Christian ethics. It has to do with love as the fulfillment of the law. Against that sentimentalism which allows itself to be deceived by good intentions, love requires direct action. It differs from the law, not by soaring above obligations, but by uniting and summarizing all commandments in a single attitude, thereby relieving the individual of trying to follow an endless chain of precepts. From the standpoint of worldly prudence Christianity is more demanding, not less demanding, than legalism, because (as we have seen) it requires subordination of all other concerns to *Agape*. Thus it deprives us of those relative standards by which (in comparison with other human beings) we may regard ourselves as righteous; and when it comes into conflict with idolatrous attachments it may even require action that *looks* like hatred. The latter consideration underlies the Gospel sayings about hating father and mother—which mean that earthly affections must be sacrificed when they stand in the way of fidelity to God. It is not surprising, therefore, that men try to find some way of devising moral standards without reference to God; but Kierkegaard shows, with considerable acuteness, how a humanistic ethic inevitably swings helplessly between individual arbitrariness on the one hand and conformity to (dubious) collective patterns on the other.

Real responsibility is reached only when *Agape* is taken as the standard, for it alone can expose the enslavements of both individual failure and social conditioning, and thereby lead to emancipation. The price, however, is terribly high. Anyone can get a reputation for being "loving" merely by joining with other selfish people for selfish purposes; and if he passes up certain immediate advantages for the much greater ones that conformity to popular demand can bring, he may even be regarded as "sacrificial." But if he insists on trying to follow

Agape, and thus comes into conflict with these earthly definitions of love, he is likely to win a Cross instead of friends.

Thus Kierkegaard conceives of the "Christian revolution" as entirely inward—as transforming every human relationship without altering economic or political arrangements at all. There is something to be said for his contention that so long as one tries to deal with the latter problems merely by external policies, significant changes will not occur. But it does not follow that the internal change is enough. As a consequence of the author's blindness at this point, the book offers observations that are illuminating for personal morality but inapplicable to politics. Take, for example, the dictum of the fourth discourse about "loving the men we see." Kierkegaard shows how one who "carries love within him" will not haughtily insist that the person toward whom he directs it must be "worthy" or free from imperfection; he will know that those who are weak and despicable are the ones who need it most, and he will not need to blind himself to the defects even of those dearest to him. This kind of *Agape* can remain constant, no matter what others do, because it does not depend on their behavior; therefore it never rationalizes resentment by trying to prove that the other is to blame for lack of love in the relationship. All of this, and much more in the discourse, applies validly and forcefully to person-to-person affairs; but because states are not persons it offers no help toward bringing Christian ethics into connection with political problems.

Another misgiving will be felt by many readers of this book. Kierkegaard equated Christian love with rigorous self-denial, and "natural" standards with selfishness. Is this formula not an over-simplification? And may not his assumption that the true Christian is always persecuted by the world conceal a deep self-hatred and hatefulness toward humanity on his own part? He was aware of the problem. "It is certainly a perverted hatred of the world which . . . wishes to be persecuted" (p. 156). But to see a problem is not necessarily to solve it.

The ten discourses and Conclusion, which make up the second half of the book, are based in part upon the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians. They incorporate the same ideas as the preceding, but develop them in a somewhat less polemical, more serenely meditative

manner. The second discourse and the Conclusion may serve as examples.

The second discourse is entitled: "Love Believeth All Things—and yet is never deceived." The love which believes all things must be distinguished from thoughtless credulity that believes what it hears, vanity that believes everything flattering, and spitefulness that believes everything bad. Yet love, "which is never deceived," is at the opposite pole from mistrustful shrewdness. Most men live according to a compromise; they believe a little, mistrust a little, and love—a little. They refuse to believe anything except on the basis of knowledge. Nevertheless, since knowledge is unable to get beyond a balance of possibilities, one must choose, and in choosing he reveals himself. Mistrust tilts the balance in the direction of assuming that what appears to be true may turn out to be a deception. Love tilts it in the direction of assuming that what appears to be base may turn out to possess redeeming qualities. The one risks missing the best, for fear of being deceived; the other risks being deceived, for fear of missing the truth that only venturous belief can reach. But the latter is not credulous; it is aware of everything mistrust *knows,* without being mistrustful.

Both the suspicious and the loving know that men differ so mysteriously that they cannot be judged collectively, but this common knowledge is inconclusive; unless we went beyond it, by a decision of will, we would never act. The former make a one-sided decision; they are afraid of thinking too well of a man, but have no qualms about the possibility of thinking too ill of him; they regard it as stupid to be "taken in," but wise to be cynical about goodness whenever they seem to encounter it. They suffer not from a lack of knowledge but from a lack of love. Thereby they reveal an unconscious preference for evil; to decide in favor of the worst, one must carry the worst around inside himself.

The lover, on the other hand, will sometimes turn out to be right in believing the best versus appearances; and even when he is wrong, those who betray him cannot undermine his blessedness, since that blessedness does not depend upon getting tangible advantages in return; the lover carries it within himself. He is subject to a subtle temptation, however, since he may find it hard to be regarded as a stupid fool. In order to retain love, he must give up the desire to be thought clever; he must be content to be simple. Then if a deceiver

uses his cunning to evoke love, he will be wasting his time, since that love is already forthcoming. If the deceiver enjoys the triumph of refusing to love in return, he injures only himself. The true lover has not been duped, because he does not ask whether the other is "worthy." This is an outcome that would drive the deceiver insane if he could grasp it, for it leaves guileless, impractical people in an impregnable position. They are wise enough to know they are being fooled, silly enough to go on loving, and yet they win.

The Conclusion deals with the sense in which love transcends duty. Only at the last is it possible to speak in these terms, because only one who has reached the consummation of the way of love can afford to forget that it is commanded. If one tries to begin with the thought that duty has been abolished, Christian love becomes something soft and insipid, whereas, up until the very last, the Gospel has a note of austerity in it. It assures a man that he receives what accords with his faith, but it does not assure him that he has faith. If one approaches it with irresoluteness, what he gets back from it is—his own irresoluteness. To the humble lover this Gospel is mild, because it transcends legalistic requirements; but to the hard of heart it is severe, since it is a mirror that will not deceive.

The impartiality of this mirror is reflected in our relations with men as well as with God. Forgiveness on our part is a condition of our being forgiven; for how can a man really believe in his own forgiveness if his whole life is an argument against there being any? Conversely, to accuse another man is to accuse oneself. Once a thief stole a hundred-dollar bill and went to a fellow-criminal to get it changed. The latter took the bill into the next room, and when he came back greeted the thief as though he now saw him for the first time. The thief was so enraged that he took the matter to court, but the first question the impartial judge asked was: "How did you obtain the hundred dollars?"

No man who is aware of God's presence can regard himself as in a strong position for making accusations. He will realize that, once strictness gets started, God can always, so to speak, overbid him. Thus the Gospel is not only a mirror; it is also an Echo which intensifies our own voices and takes away all pretensions to merit. If we shout: "I demand justice!" the Echo will reply: "I demand justice!" Who is bold enough to think that he can pass this test? But if we cry out "Grace," the answer comes back, "Grace."

II

The other volumes to be surveyed take us to the end of Kierkegaard's career. In September 1851, a year after *Training in Christianity*,[2] he published *For Self-Examination. Judge for Yourselves!* was written soon afterward, but, along with other papers, it fell into the hands of his brother Peter and was not published until more than twenty years after S. K.'s death. These two books, together with "Two Discourses at the Communion" at the beginning and a sermon on "The Unchangeableness of God" at the end, have been published as a single volume in the English translation.

The Preface to the "Two Discourses at the Communion" declares that the literary work which began with *Either/Or* "seeks here its definite point of rest at the foot of the altar." Once again he disclaims being "a witness for the truth," regarding himself as "only a peculiar sort of poet and thinker who, 'without authority', . . . would read the fundamental document of the individual, humane existence-relationship. . . ." Kierkegaard brought his work to a close with unconscionable frequency. He wrote *Finis* at the end of the *Postscript* in 1846, and then continued to produce books with undiminished vigor. He finished his "literature" with the writings now under consideration, and then proceeded to write several hundred pages of polemics as a "deed."

For Self-Examination begins with Socrates. Socrates could forego oratory in his Apology because he had devoted his whole life to the performance of his mission, and the threat of death did not alter the fact that he had to continue saying the same thing. No special preparation was necessary, because his whole philosophical quest had been a preparation for death. Should not the same thing be true of Christian preaching? No sermonic eloquence, augmented by literary allusions and admirable gestures, can be a substitute for the preacher's preparation through living what he utters. Kierkegaard has no desire, of course, to encourage empty-headed laziness under the guise of depending on the Holy Spirit. "It is certain," he writes, "that without preparation, twaddlers will twaddle." What he means is that artistry should not be allowed to conceal the discrepancy between the Gospel and the preacher's existence.

2. See *The Review of Religion*, March 1946, pp. 294 ff.

These remarks are preliminary to his employment in Part I of a text from James 1:22 ff. which declares that one who is a "hearer only" is like a man who looks at himself in a mirror and then straightway forgets what he saw. The main problem is how to drive home the point without seeming to revive the doctrine of salvation through works. Hence, on the one hand, Kierkegaard (once again) repudiates medieval monasticism, but, on the other hand, he attacks the distorted Lutheranism which ignores Luther's strenuous life and regards salvation as something that can be received without any ethical struggle whatever. He observes that people either want to get credit (merit) for good deeds, or they want to get saved by divine grace without having to do anything. Against both he declares: "Christianity's requirement is: Thy life shall as strenuously as possible give expression to works—and then one thing more is required: that thou humble thyself and admit, 'But none the less I am saved by grace' " (p. 42).

In order to demonstrate the Protestant character of his statement, he enters into an amusing imaginary conversation with Luther. When S. K. protests that he has faith, Luther replies that no protest is needed if he has it and none avails if he does not. What Luther wants to know about is the sacrifice made for the Gospel, and when S. K. reiterates that he *must* have faith, since he describes it in his books, Luther declares "I believe this fellow is mad." To describe faith only proves that a man is a poet; to weep in the process only proves that he is an actor.

Hence Kierkegaard turns to a description of what is involved in being a "witness for the truth"—a title which he refrained from applying to himself, and to which he attached such importance that he was outraged when Martensen applied it to Bishop Mynster after the latter's death. A primary requirement is solitariness. Religious reformation must begin with the individual, and he must go forward against hatred and persecution—unafraid, because he is so much afraid before God. Even though he is against external disorder, he will be accused of overturning everything because he is the foe of spiritual disorder. (Despite Kierkegaard's disclaimers, this description corresponds closely to his own life, and there is more than a trace of vindictiveness when he asks the happily married man to contrast his life with that of a "witness").

In pursuing his discussion of the Word of God as a mirror, Kierke-

gaard warns against allowing higher criticism of the Bible to interfere with the impact of its truth. Pre-occupation with variant readings and scholarly opinions may become a crafty device for evading what it discloses about human life. If someone received a love-letter written in a foreign language, he would never confuse the labor of translating it with actually appropriating its content. The lover would immediately comply with the plain requests, and make out the obscure passages when he found time; he would have no fear of doing more than was expected of him. But with the Bible the opposite is frequently the case. Erudition is allowed to divert attention from its clear commands, and action is delayed lest, through misunderstanding, one might do "too much" in serving the will of God!

Actually, the Bible is a dangerous book; give it a finger and it takes the whole hand. Yet, since it is passed around freely, even to impressionable young people, a way has evidently been found of reducing its power. One efficient device is to weigh the conflicting opinions of commentators. Presto! Judgment is suspended, and one can rest in the pleasant assumption that he would certainly follow its bidding if only he could get a clear interpretation. No wonder most people ignore the Bible as an antiquated document, while the rest read it learnedly . . . as an antiquated document. The remedy is to look at one's image in the mirror of passages which are quite clear. "Give all thy goods to the poor" and "turn the other cheek" are about as difficult to understand as "it's a nice day." It is human to beg for compassion in the face of such severe requirements, but it is evasive to insert variant interpretations between oneself and the Word, like a boy putting napkins in his pants before a thrashing.

Another "enlightened" approach turns the Bible into objective doctrine, thus keeping it at a safe distance, and regards applying it to oneself as an individual as "morbid" and "introspective." In order to illustrate the difference between objective and existential thinking, Kierkegaard retells the story of David and Nathan (II Samuel 11-12). David has rationalized the situation, saying to himself that it was Uriah's own foolhardiness that got him killed, and that he (David) is doing a kingly thing in marrying the widow of a soldier. After hearing Nathan's story about the ewe lamb, he makes some cultivated remarks—for David was a poet—about the artistry of its presentation. Then Nathan says: "Thou art the man." Immediately David's attitude

toward the story leaps from the objective to the existential. He already knew how guilty he was, but he could evade the knowledge so long as he could preserve a detached attitude. The word "Thou" made him see himself in the mirror.

Kierkegaard attributed the attempt to extend objective methods into the realm of personal decision to cunning—"something we obtain gratis . . . along with original sin" (p. 64). Today we encounter the issue, misstated as an enlightened quest for truth vs. irrational subjectivism. He perceived that between these two extremes stands responsible personal decision, which must always be passionate, though never blind. He was not a foe of higher criticism and objective science as such; he attacked them only in so far as they purported to make personal religious concern superfluous.

The second and third parts of *For Self-Examination*—meditations, respectively, on the Ascension and Pentecost—are devoted in a characteristic way to the Kierkegaardian thesis that the triumph and beatitude of Christianity can be reached only by passing through voluntary suffering and renunciation of the world.

He intended to issue *Judge for Yourselves!* as a sequel. Perhaps he put it aside in favor of the more devastating "Attack" because *For Self-Examination* failed to arouse attention. At any rate, *Judge for Yourselves!* is also devoted to the thesis that Christianity and the world stand in irreconcilable opposition.

Part I (based on I Peter 4:7) declares that what the world calls sobriety, Chrisianity calls drunkenness, and vice versa; what one calls love, the other calls selfishness; what one calls clear intelligence, the other calls stupefaction. When faith ventures beyond a consideration of probabilities it is called irrational, though actually it does not disregard such probabilities as can be ascertained, and it should be radically distinguished from the kind of reliance upon God which identifies His will with one's private wishes, makes Him the guarantor of success, and then calls itself venturesome. The stupidity of pseudo-faith should deter us, not from relying upon God, but from stupidity. It is against calculating worldliness that Christian faith must venture out. The worldly mind becomes so absorbed with advantages that are within man's own reach that it falls into a kind of "auto-intoxication" —indifferent to questions about what man *ought* to be as contrasted with what he regards as "feasible."

In order to illustrate his point, Kierkegaard tells a story, which became famous in Denmark, about a divinity student. One assumes that the young theologian is seeking first the Kingdom of God. The assumption is wrong. He is seeking first a parish and a salary. Eventually he gets them; but then he discovers that the salary is inadequate because he has now acquired something else—a wife. Everyone expects him to preach about seeking first the Kingdom of God, but nobody expects him to live that way. From a worldly standpoint this is all perfectly sober; from a Christian standpoint it is "crazy drunk."

We are accustomed to having performances fall short of ideals; those who praise humility are seldom humble, those who are skeptical are seldom doubtful of their own perspicuity, and those who are eloquent about self-denial are usually quite well off. And by fitting into the pattern of expectation, with a hypocritical amalgam of stern words and comfortable living, Christianity has brought itself to a standstill. Actually Christianity is an offence; it is treason against the natural man. No one fulfils its requirements, and yet we have whole countries full of "Christians." This is because we have indulgently adjusted Christianity to our own convenience instead of being transformed by it.

How can such a condemnatory message be regarded as "the Good News"? In Part II—"Christ as the Pattern"—Kierkegaard replies that full awareness of our human defects and needs can alone lead to redemption. Once one realizes that he cannot fulfil the requirements of Christianity through his own striving, he can grasp the fact of salvation through Christ. The other alternative, of course, is to adjust Him to what we find congenial. Worldly common sense could dispense with the star at the Nativity, but it would insist upon normal wedlock for the parents and a prosperous middle-class environment for the Babe. It does not like this combination of extremes where the glory of God comes in lowliness; it would rather scale the divine downward and the human upward until they could meet at a prosaic level. Nor did it like the ideal human nature which Christ embodied. That is why the people voted to release Barabbas; after all, a robber at least takes the value of money seriously, but one who cares nothing about property, success and prestige must be regarded as a fool lest he make fools of us.

Since Christ went to His death for serving one Master, it is not surprising that nobody follows. Nor is it surprising that when Christi-

anity is accomodated somewhat to our frailties, many take up with it. While if the Pattern is ignored entirely, then Christendom and the world become so identical that "Christianity" is universally accepted and universally destroyed. Once men substitute "average human nature" for Christ as the standard by which they judge themselves, it is easy to feel that one is doing all right without divine grace. Yet this complacency has not actually eradicated neurotic disorders. People go on diets and trot off to resorts when what is really troubling them is a bad conscience, even though they deny its existence. What does the church do? It prescribes conventional virtue as a remedy and adds a pious mood as a chaser. This is Christianity in the same sense that a slight belly ache is cholera.

In an age when nobody finds anything alarming in the Gospel, there is little danger of making it so severe that men will revolt against it; but there is real danger of making it so indistinguishable from middle-class prudence that it becomes superfluous. The seriousness of following Christ must be brought to light again, not to scold men, but simply to restore integrity. Anxiety can be cured only when men acknowledge what they are meant to be, and thus turn in their need to the divine power which alone can enable them to reach self-understanding.

III

The *Attack upon "Christendom"* contains twenty-one articles which Kierkegaard published in *The Fatherland,* a political journal, between December 1854 and May 1855, and ten numbers of his own magazine, *The Instant,* all except the last of which were published between May and October, 1855. (Dr. Lowrie has also included two pamphlets which were issued separately. A sermon on "The Unchangeablness of God" was published between Nos. VII and VIII of *The Instant,* although it had been delivered four years earlier in the Citadel Church; an English translation of it can be found at the end of *For Self-Examination* and *Judge for Yourselves!*). The last number of *The Instant* was never published, because it lay upon his desk when the author fell paralyzed in the street.

Much of Kierkegaard's work calls for the exercise of discrimination on the part of the reader, and the *Attack* imposes the severest test of all. It is a mistake to dismiss what he has to say as the intemperate ravings of a half-mad fanatic; it is equally mistaken to be browbeaten

by his vicious satire into accepting his assertions at face value. In attempting to reach a balanced evaluation, one must keep several considerations in mind. First, the endlessly repeated charges, which become so wearisome when perused at a single sitting, were spread out over a period of nine months. Each pamphlet is designed to make the whole point every time, whereas in an ordinary book the argument unfolds gradually. Second, Kierkegaard was being consciously one-sided and extreme, because his more moderate writings had made no discernible impression. Thirdly, arguments which were directed solely at the Established Church of Denmark in 1855 must not be distorted into generalizations about the church and the clergy elsewhere and in other times, though whenever the shoe pinches and the reader winces, he may be glad to find some pretext for dismissing the whole attack as unreasonable.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to remain receptive toward the salutary things he has to say while steadily rejecting the pathological aspects of his version of Christianity. Those who want to contend that Christianity is essentially unhealthy can cite this book as providing ample confirmation; while those who insist that Christianity need not be so "unbalanced" will find themselves in a camp which Kierkegaard regarded as timid and hypocritical. Therefore, let the reader find his own gloves for picking up the hot poker which this book holds out to him.

Kierkegaard was goaded into launching the attack when Professor Martensen, who succeeded Mynster as Bishop, delivered a eulogy in which he declared that the latter had been a witness to the truth. S.K. immediately prepared a scathing protest (in February 1854), but he did not publish it until ten months later. He delayed because he did not want to say anything so long as the appointment of Mynster's successor had not been determined. Moreover, a political struggle over the post was going on, and Kierkegaard (a conservative) had no desire to see his purely religious protest intermingled with this struggle in such a way as to give comfort to Martensen's liberal opponents.

When the way became clear, Kierkegaard declared that Mynster's preaching had omitted the decisive element in Christianity, namely voluntary renunciation of the world and of self, leading to agony of spirit, poverty, and crucifixion. Mynster enjoyed the comforts and eminence of a brilliant career and occupied a position of worldly

power. Therefore, to call him a "witness" is to "play" Christianity in a manner more insidious than any heresy or schism. In reply, Martensen charged that Kierkegaard erroneously equated Christianity with martyrdom. The latter's response was withering. He noted that Martensen deigned to read brief articles, though not what the new Bishop had called "the prolix Kierkegaardian literature." Acquaintance with the latter might have enabled him to realize that, although those who literally give their lives deserve first place, there is room for many more. All witnesses suffer, whether they literally get killed or not, whereas Mynster was a man of rank who made a glittering career out of preaching. It is as ridiculous to call him a witness as to call a woman a "virgin" when she is surrounded by her numerous troop of children. Of course it is to Martensen's advantage to spread the idea that one can combine being a wordly, shrewd, self-indulgent declaimer with being a Christian; but, Kierkegaard continues, let him not bemoan the scandal of the attack while "speaking . . . in the tone of a brawler and a pugilist." He "is too subaltern a person to overawe me, especially since he has begun to wear velvet" (p. 10). S.K. justifies attacking Mynster after his death on the ground that he had pressed the issue upon the old Bishop privately during his lifetime, in the hope that the latter would make the simple admission that the Established Church proffers a lenient, watered-down version of Christianity. Moreover, *Training in Christianity* and *For Self-Examination* had kept the attack so indirect that even the Bishop's enemies did not identify it as levelled against him personally. Since these more humane expedients have failed, the only alternative left is to speak openly.

Nevertheless, Martensen remained adamant and preached a Christmas sermon on the text, "Ye shall be my witnesses" (Acts 1:18). So Kierkegaard picked up the phrase about "a diversity of gifts" and expatiated upon it: Where Mynster was gifted at concealing the weaknesses of the Established Church, Martensen is gifted in laying them bare. Where Mynster was gifted at yielding shrewdly, Martensen is gifted at trying to bluff it out. Where Mynster was gifted at maintaining the Established Church, maybe Providence has selected a successor who is gifted at killing it. The only gift S.K. claims is that of being able to discern what Martensen makes obvious. But he advises the clergy to ask the new Bishop to go easy, since there is not one of them who is not comical when viewed as a witness, and it is not seemly

for a Bishop to make the whole clerical order ridiculous. As it happened, Martensen's sermon was delivered on the day after Christmas, when the martyrdom of Stephen was commemorated, and he said that the word "witness" "rings on this day with a peculiar sound." Kierkegaard agrees that this is undeniable, since either the clergy make Stephen ridiculous, or vice versa.

In the face of ensuing silence, S.K. increased the pressure of his attack. He insisted that the complete crew of bishops, deans, priests, congregations, and expensively equipped buildings give rise to a dangerous optical illusion: that Christianity exists. When the individual thinks of himself, he admits that he is not a Christian; when he thinks of ten neighbors, he knows that they aren't; but when the statistics run into hundreds of thousands, the mind becomes confused. Therefore, whereas Luther had ninety-five theses, Kierkegaard has only one: Christianity does not exist in Denmark. He declares, "Quite simply: I want honesty" (p. 37). We claim that in our ordinary self-interested pursuits we are "trying" to be Christian; this is like claiming that in taking a comfortable trip to London a man is "trying" to reach the North Pole, since in order to get there he must leave town, and obviously he has left town. Besides, no one ever reached the North Pole, so anyone who leaves town can be counted as making the effort. If people will frankly rebel against Christianity, Kierkegaard declares that (strangely enough) he is with them; for a frank rebellion can only be made by recognizing what Christianity requires. But those who do not rebel should at least be honest about the distance between their lives and genuine imitation of Christ.

The articles in *The Fatherland* reiterate the one thesis with sarcasm, fury, wit and—at times—unanswerable logic. To one critic he replies as follows:

> If I do not reform, the Dean (Bloch) would have me punished ecclesiastically. And how? Indeed the punishment is cruelly devised; it is so cruel that I counsel the women to have their smelling salts at hand in order not to faint when they hear it. If I do not reform, the church door should be closed to me. Horrible! So then, if I do not reform, I should be shut out, excluded from hearing on Sundays during the quiet hours the eloquence of the witnesses to the truth, which if it is not literally *unbezahlbare*, is yet priceless. And I, silly sheep, who can neither read nor write, and therefore, being thus excluded, must spiritually pine away. . . . (p. 45).

Not content to annihilate the critics who venture into print, he also

turns his fire upon the clergy generally for their silence. What does this silence signify? That what concerns the clergy is their salaries. If they were interested in their religion, they could hardly remain impervious when it is made a laughing-stock and a scandal.

On May 16, 1855 he published a separate pamphlet entitled *This Has To Be Said; So Be It Now Said.* Regarding its contents as decisive, he withheld it for six months after writing it, awaiting the right moment. He begins by saying that he has no authority to oblige anyone to act as he is about to recommend; but his pronouncement at least puts all who read it in a position of responsibility, since they must either accept or reject it.

> Whoever thou art, whatever in other respects thy life may be, my friend, by ceasing to take part (if ordinarily thou dost) in the public worship of God, as it now is (with the claim that it is the Christianity of the New Testament), thou hast constantly one guilt less, and that a great one: thou dost not take part in treating God as a fool. . . . (p. 59).

Now that he has finally said it, he continues, it makes no difference if people try to pretend that nothing has happened. They know what he says is true, only no one else will say it. One person was required as a sacrifice. Clearly Kierkegaard expected to bring serious persecution down upon himself for his utterance. In his Journal he admits that he fears it, because he is not sure that he has the strength to withstand it. Obviously, however, he sought far more violent treatment than he ever actually received. It is easy for less gifted people to see how many motives intermingle here—trying to prove to himself that he is a real, suffering Christian, trying to atone for deep feelings of guilt, disguising his hatred for humanity in general and for those who enjoy ecclesiastical eminence, professorial rank, or matrimonial bliss (things he missed and might have had) in particular. But we must also see him as a lonely genius who was not altogether wrong in regarding himself as engaged in a desperate battle against spiritual disease; nor was the sickness wholly in him; his diagnosis of "the age" turned out to be right.

The second phase of the attack begins with the publication of his own pamphlet-journal, *The Instant.* The title signified an "atom of eternity," not something ephemeral. Yet he adds prophetically: "In *one* sense I must say of my whole previous work, that its time has not yet come" (p. 91). He is therefore prepared to hear even his friend-

liest critics protest that his attack is "too frightfully decisive." An age whose spiritual decadence is manifest in accepting ideas only "to a certain extent" cannot be handled gently. To make any impression one has to spring like a wild beast upon its prey. Who should know this better than one whom even the children on the streets call "Either/-Or"? To follow Christ "to a certain degree" transforms Christianity into twaddle.

Because Kierkegaard focussed attention upon the amalgamation between the State and the Church, much of what he says may seem to have little applicability to a country like the United States. Yet he chose this particular phenomenon merely as the most vulnerable point at which to drive a wedge between Christianity and worldliness. His main task was to attack nominal, secularized Christianity, and he likened the pain involved in relinquishing religious illusions to the therapeutic treatment of a neurotic patient. Hence it should not be difficult for a contemporary reader to detach many of his principles from their local setting and test them for their applicability to the present religious situation.

On June 16, 1855 he published a separate pamphlet entitled: *What Christ's Judgment Is about Official Christianity.* In it he explains that his work as a detective prompted him to represent himself at the outset as a poet. He was aware of those freethinkers (Strauss and Feuerbach) who said frankly that Christianity is poetry, and how they differed from official Christianity, which turns religion into poetry while solemnly proclaiming it to be true. As long as he enunciated Christian ideals poetically, the parsons did not feel themselves threatened in the least, and the detective was enabled to observe his quarry without alarming them; but when the poet threw away his guitar and picked up the *New Testament,* there was first an outcry, in an effort to dismiss his utterances as poetic extravagance, and then when that failed—silence. After carefully gathering his evidence, the poet-detective has made a straight accusation, and the criminals sit biting their lips. Their punishment shall be as follows: They must read a passage from the *New Testament* to their congregations and then stand silent for five minutes in the pulpit, instead of explaining it away. The passage is Matthew 23:29 ff.:

> Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye build the sepulchers of the prophets and garnish the tombs of the righteous, and say, "If we had

been in the days of our fathers, we should not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets." Wherefore ye witness to yourselves, that ye are sons of them that slew the prophets. Fill up then the measure of your fathers. Ye serpents, ye offspring of vipers, how shall ye escape the judgment of hell?

The punishment is not intended to make the parson blush, for anyone who can take his oath upon the *New Testament* does not blush easily. But presumably the congregation may blush for the parson, for he has been playing Christianity in the same way that children play at war; there is no danger, and one only pretends it is a matter of life and death. Christ has given the judgment. This is hypocrisy. And if He walked into a church today He would call it a place—not of robbers, exactly, but—of business. No doubt it is shocking to envisage Him with a whip in His hand, using harsh language. The parsons have made Him into an insipid, kindly figure in order to keep on good terms with their congregations, especially when the plate is passed.

The Instant plays variations upon this single theme. Kierkegaard contends that in seeking to fuse the infinite and the finite, the divine and the natural, the established Church *has* to depart from Christianity. Therefore the parson cannot avoid hypocrisy, but whenever it bothers him, all he has to do is go to his wife; she will point out that so long as they have each other, nothing else matters, and besides, as she adds, all the other parsons have the same misgivings. Thus, by disregarding the impractical methods of Jesus, a huge business can be built up by peddling an *ersatz* product. What is really shocking about this is that the destroyers of Christianity enjoy the reputation of being its zealous missionaries. This is like palming oneself off as a shepherd by presenting a testimonial from the wolf. Indeed, if it were not for eternity and its reckoning, the Bible would be uttering the biggest lie in history when it says: "God is not mocked."

Only one difficulty stands in the way of getting men to see the difference between genuine and counterfeit Christianity, but it is well-nigh insuperable. Genuine Christianity is repugnant to the natural man, whereas the counterfeit is produced simply by finding out what will appeal to people en masse. If we can assume that God does not exist, then counterfeit Christianity is a charming invention for making life as enjoyable as possible; but only atheism can justify turning the Gospel into a sort of musical accompaniment for weddings, baptisms, and community parties.

Once again, let us admit that Kierkegaard had a point—which may easily be forgotten in revulsion against his examples. He declared that Christianity wants chastity, while in the "Christendom" of Denmark a man must be a Christian to keep a whore house. (This was a fact.) Christianity wants honesty; but in Denmark swindling is carried on by Christian business men. (This is a fact in most countries.) Christianity wants to abolish vain honors; but in Denmark the Cross is used as a decoration for a distinguished order. Christianity directs its message to the individual; but in Denmark the language of religion has become an official, impersonal patter wherein everyone says what is expected and nobody takes it to heart. Christianity demands an extraordinary achievement of human freedom; but in Denmark being Christian is not rare at all, since it is simply equivalent with being human.

In the magnificent cathedral the Honorable and Right Reverend Geheime-General-Ober-Hof-Prädikant, the elect favorite of the fashionable world, appears before an elect company and preaches *with emotion* upon the text he himself elected: "God hath elected the base things of the world, and the things that are despised"—and nobody laughs (p. 181).

The later issues of *The Instant* present a sort of bill of particulars in his indictment against the church. What has happened to worship? It has become a play which, unlike the theater, dishonestly pretends to be something else. What has become of preaching? It has become a form of escapist poetry which transforms something which is terrible as a reality into a refined enjoyment. What has become of the Dominical Sacraments? So far as baptism is concerned, you must picture a young politician who has no religion at all, but who feels constrained to join the church after he gets married and has a child. Then he and another young man with no religion at all (the god-father) appear at the baptism of the baby and promise to look after its Christian nurture. So far as the Lord's Supper is concerned, you must picture a business man who knows that everybody has to be hardheaded to make a profit, but who also knows that unless he joins the church people may doubt his respectability. Therefore two or three times a year he puts on his best clothes and goes to communion, in order to commemorate the sacrifice and death of Christ. What has become of theological training? The candidate starts out to seek first the Kingdom of God, but somehow he never gets around to putting it first because a salary, a

wife and a promotion intervene.[3] What has become of confirmation? It provides the excuse for another family celebration, and a fifteen year old boy, whom his father wouldn't trust with ten dollars, is regarded as man enough to decide for himself about Christianity. What has happened to marriage? The New Testament prefers chastity and adds, as a concession, "it is better to marry than to burn." But such notions are unpopular, so Christendom gathers battalions of breeders together who are not individually willing to be Christian, but who are quite willing to spread Christianity by producing millions of children through whom they can take their religion vicariously by sending them to Sunday School. Then the children grow up and use the same dodge. In the meantime, the priest gets his fee for each wedding ceremony. Half-educated in the poets and half-educated in the New Testament, he delivers a half-erotic, half-religious address; inability to control sexual lust gets happily identified with an act of worship; and everyone is highly pleased by the arrangement.

What has become of Christian education? The parents cannot teach the child that he has been born into a world of sin; childhood is not equipped to comprehend anything so serious. Consequently, under the name of Christian education, the teachers babble foolishly about what a beautiful world it is and how God is a great help even though, unfortunately, He cannot be expected to fulfill quite every wish. The child either grows up and repeats this babble, or he comes to a point where he must painfully recognize that his teachers were liars. What has become of the priesthood? There is not one honest priest. They all get paid as a combination of civil servant and disciple of Christ, when the two cannot be combined. They ought to wear stripes, like convicts, to stand for their double allegiance. And many of the best priests have entered the profession because where the general standard of performance is so mediocre, it is easy to reach a position of prominence with a minimum of effort. What has become of the congregations? They are merely interested in religion, and when someone tells them the truth about the church they are again merely interested. This is as though, when a man's friend tells him that his wife has been unfaithful, he were to say: "I'm much interested, especially in the skill you have used in proving my wife's infidelity. But I can't divorce her; I'm too accustomed to her. Besides, she has property,

3. See supra, p. 392.

and I can't do without that. However, I'll be much interested if you'll keep me posted" (cf. p. 231).

The fact that Kierkegaard published his sermon on "The Unchangeableness of God" immediately after this outrageous diatribe shows that he was anxious to have his protest understood as springing from within the church, not as delivered from the outside. Occasionally he warns skeptics and mockers against taking comfort in his remarks, even though they would give anything to be able to do what he is doing. Irreligion has no power against sham religion; only religious seriousness—"laughter administered in fear and trembling" (p. 219)—can wield the scourge that is needed.

The tenth issue of *The Instant,* Kierkegaard's last will and testament, shows that he was obsessed by the idea that he was the "right man" to introduce Christianity into Christendom. While admitting that he is not a Christian, he has made it evident that others are even less so. As a result of his unique position, he declares, he is the only person capable of criticizing his own work! But the price of his uniqueness is this: "I was never like others" (p. 285). Then follows an account of how tormenting it was in youth to feel isolated from everything normally human and merry; of how he strove to hide his melancholy; and of how, with the years, as he became "spirit," the pain diminished. So, at the end, he has nothing to complain about, because he understands that everything that happened to him flowed from a divine love which was training him to become a sacrifice. Pathetically he insists that, despite his spiritual isolation, he did not separate his life from the plain man. He recalls how he walked the streets, knew everyone, and never attained any importance. He counts himself as belonging to the plain people even though, during the dispute with the *Corsair,* they found him ridiculous. Besides being a last groping effort on the part of a dreadfully solitary man to establish human ties, this passage may betray a recognition that following "the Pattern" involves an uncomplicated love for people—which Kierkegaard certainly did not possess—as well as suffering.

IV

Mr. Bretall's *Anthology* will serve a variety of useful purposes. It will be especially welcome to teachers who have wanted to introduce something by Kierkegaard into their courses. Heretofore they have

confronted an insuperable difficulty, because no single volume, nor even two or three, can give a representative idea of Kierkegaard's thought; moreover, several of the most important works are too expensive for most students. In fact, anyone who would be glad to have an accurate conception of how his thought developed, but who does not feel inclined to read through twenty or more books to obtain it, will be grateful for this Anthology.

Besides a general introduction and bibliography, Mr. Bretall provides a brief introduction for each selection. Since the selections are arranged, with one or two justifiable exceptions, in chronological order, they enable the reader to get a Bretall's eye view of Kierkegaard's intellectual career, and to put each major work in its appropriate setting. The biographical details are kept to a minimum because they are accessible in Dr. Lowrie's two books (one long, one short) on Kierkegaard's life.

The editor admits that he has allowed his personal preferences to guide him in selecting the material, and in his preface he protects himself in advance against some of the criticisms which might naturally arise. Any student of Kierkegaard is sure to think of many important passages which the Anthology is compelled to omit. For example, there is no excerpt at all from *The Concept of Dread,* and the selection from Part I of the *Stages* gives only the setting of the Banquet, fore and aft, while omitting the speeches which contain all the thought! The "Diary of the Seducer" is included as "a masterly short novel", and "Quidam's Diary" is omitted entirely on the ground that it is "rather dull." Actually both productions are so tortuous as to be rather dull, but "Quidam's Diary" contains, in the birthday entries, material that is absolutely indispensable for understanding Kierkegaard. And so one might proceed indefinitely, but there is a very simple way of putting an end to one's reflections. Take a pencil and paper; put all the books before you; and then make out your own list—confining it, remember, to five hundred pages. Begin, preferably, by deciding how you will manage to make a brief, but not misleading, excerpt from *The Concept of Dread.* Very shortly you will fall into despair and resort to the remedy of recommending Mr. Bretall's *Anthology* to all those troublesome people who insist on asking where to begin in reading Kierkegaard.

BOOK REVIEWS

The God Ptah. By Maj Sandman Holmberg. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946. 292 pp., plus 64 pp. of hieroglyphic text and 22 figures.

Writing a monograph on an Egyptian god is a thankless task. Despite a large body of material, and notwithstanding the labors of several generations of Egyptologists, Egyptian religion appears to us moderns considerably less intelligible than any other aspect of the Pharaonic civilization. Every scholar who writes on Egyptian religion is faced with the strangeness of that multicolored polytheism in which male and female, human and animal-shaped, childlike and age-old gods who dwell in heaven, on earth, and in the nether world, mingle and coalesce in a universe which they have created but which they do not transcend.

Paradoxically, the scholar who deals with Egyptian religion as a whole is less in a quandary than he who attempts to describe and interpret a single one of the gods. For the presentation of the whole will be useful even when it fails to produce a synthesis, whereas the monograph inevitably aims at a convincing recreation of the individual deity. And here the extraordinary elusiveness of Egyptian gods makes itself felt with a vengeance.

Mrs. Sandman Holmberg's monograph on the god Ptah is a perfect, if unwitting, illustration of the dilemma. For her collection of the material, especially a number of unpublished texts, every Egyptologist will be grateful. She has organized the evidence in a clear and simple manner. First, the name and the appearance of the god are discussed; then the function which appears to be his basic one—that of a creator of the world—is analyzed. His role as master craftsman is subsumed under that of creator. Then his less salient features, such as protector of the dead, dispenser of justice, his regal attributes, and his presence at the royal jubilee are described. This is followed by a survey of Ptah's connections with other gods of the Egyptian pantheon. In these sections of the book the author has to state time and again that not one of Ptah's attributes and functions is exclusively his own; all were borne by other gods as well. An explanation of this well-known but little understood phenomenon can hardly be asked for, but a greater awareness of the problem involved might have led to a more searching analysis.

The next chapter deals with the centres of the cult of Ptah, starting with Memphis, his chief city, and ending with evidence of his worship in Palestine. This section is, to my mind, the most satisfactory of the book, as it makes good use of little known material. The final chapter attempts to elucidate the origins of the god. The Egyptian texts quoted in translation throughout the book are autographed in the appendix, and a number of photographs and drawings illustrating the appearance of Ptah complete the study.

The value of the book lies in its clear and forthright presentation of a considerable body of evidence. The interpretation takes into account all previous research and the conclusions of other scholars to which the author adds her own. The care and caution of the study are altogether creditable, so is the courage of having undertaken the task at all. One might, however, have wished for a more profound understanding of the tremendous difficulties inherent in the subject, and also for a greater distrust of concepts derived from the study of other religions and not adequate for things Egyptian. Such an ill-fitting concept is the alleged androgyny of Ptah, which the author deduces from texts which describe the creator-god as one who "begets" and "gives birth." The fact is that all Egyptian creator-gods are viewed as wholly male beings who, in the absence of any female counterpart, create the world by begetting other gods upon themselves. That is the specifically Egyptian view of the creativity of the primordial gods, a view in which the notion of androgyny plays no part at all. If the concept of bisexuality were present, it would appear in the iconography. It can not be deduced from phrases such as "fashioner and mother who gave birth to the gods," the metaphorical character of which is borne out by the fact that the word "to give birth" is commonly used in Egyptian to describe a number of creative activities, such as the making of statutes.

In the final chapter, the author wrestles with the question whether the belief in Ptah originated in a basic worship of cosmic gods, or whether Ptah is to be considered a local god developed from a fetish who evolved into a cosmic power in the course of time. The author adopts the first alternative and sketches the earliest nature of Ptah as "a being who, perhaps without a detailed description of his qualities, was powerful in heaven and on earth." It seems to me that, rather than speculating about origins for which no proof can be forthcoming,

since they lie in the prehistoric past which can only be inferred from the later historical records, the emphasis in the interpretation should be on the historical form of the god. But though the study as a whole is obviously concerned with the god as he appears in the historical period, the author has been unable to draw an integrated and compelling picture. This failure is, as has been indicated at the beginning of this review, largely due to the baffling complexity of Egyptian religion, against which Egyptologists are continually struggling. A new and very brilliant interpretation of the protean character of Egyptian gods—their immanence in nature, the incompleteness of their individualization, and their ability to manifest themselves in a variety of forms—has just been given by H. Frankfort in his *Ancient Egyptian Religion: An Interpretation* (Columbia University Press, 1948). It may be hoped than an understanding of the very elusiveness of Egyptian gods will give to future monographs the power of compelling the god to live within the pages of the book.

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Corpus Hermeticum. Text established by A. D. Nock and translated by A.-J. Festugière. Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1945. Tome I, Traités I-XII, liii + 195 pp. Tome II, Traités XIII-XVIII, *Asclépius,* 207 pp. (pp. 197-404). 300 fr.

During the Renaissance, the Hermetic writings of the late classical period (ca.3rd century A.D.) were immensely popular with the later Neo-Platonists of Italy. For several centuries after the time of Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino, they were relegated to a secondary position in classical and biblical philology though never wholly forgotten. With the rise of the modern school of historians of western religion, typified by Reitzenstein, they have brilliantly emerged into the full light of scholarly publicity, if that quasi-oxymoron may be permitted.

All students of the religious philosophy of late antiquity know how important these Hermetic texts are for a thorough understanding of philosophical Gnosticism and, in general, for perspective on the history

of western mysticism. Unfortunately there has been no generally accessible, and at the same time reliable, edition of the Greek text. While no one would fail to appreciate the great ingenuity and industry shown by the late Walter Scott in translating and commenting on the Hermetic Corpus, no one can fail to recognize, at the same time, that his Greek text is a spectacular example of how an over-responsible editorial conscience can lead to editorial irresponsibility. So little faith did Scott have in the MS. tradition that he almost rewrote the Greek text, or at any rate recklessly rearranged it.

Merely by providing us with a readable and sound text of the Corpus, Professors Nock and Festugière have earned the gratitude of the learned world. But they have done much more than that. They have also enlisted the constant services of such eminent authorities on Hellenistic religion as H. C. Puech and Franz Cumont, and such competent textual experts as our own Benedict Einarson and Milton Anastos, in improving the translation and commentary as well as the Greek and Latin texts. The editors have also drawn upon the erudition of a great many scholars in this field, although they themselves are universally recognized masters of Hermetic and related literature.

Nock has furnished a brief Preface and critical Introduction as well as the text and critical apparatus. Festugière is responsible for the translation and commentary and the Introductions to the several treatises. He has also announced his intention of publishing a third volume on the background of Hermetic literature.

An ambitious work like the present one cannot be discussed adequately in anything less than a long and detailed review. Here I can give only a preliminary appraisal and note some of the obvious merits and occasional slight deficiencies of this excellent collaboration.

In his brief Preface, Nock has justly observed that the Hermetic writings aid us in understanding Neo-Platonism's attraction for late antiquity and that, together with the *Chaldaean Oracles*, they offer striking resemblances to many writings of Christian Gnosticism. I should be inclined, however, to ascribe to Egyptian thought greater influence upon Hermeticism than does he. See now, *inter alia*, Aram M. Frenkian, *L'Orient et les Origines de l'Idéalisme Subjectif dans la Pensée européenne* (Paris, 1946). Also it is a little surprising to find him denying any evident mark of Christianity or Neo-Platonism in

Hermetic literature. I wonder whether most classicists, including Nock, have not overlooked what one might call proto-Gnosticism in Plato himself, for example, in the *ekmageion* concept and sexual mythology of the *Timaeus,* and have not similarly been at fault in overlooking the more evident traces of at least a superficial Gnosticism in such a Jewish Platonist as Philo, and in such a professed Anti-Gnostic as Paul. Of course, those who object to this view might say, among other things, that it all depends on how one defines Gnosticism. But that is too involved a question to be profitably argued in a brief review. At any rate, I should be inclined to place Hermeticism as about half-way between Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism.

Of Nock's systematic discussion of the MSS. and text transmission there is little to be said beyond that it is clear, sensible, and extremely useful. Here again I venture to obtrude myself by remarking that in dealing with a collection like the Hermetic Corpus, where there is no pervasive individual style or rigorous system of thought to guide one in establishing the best of several readings, it is impossible to avoid a certain amount of deliberate subjectivism or to be content with a largely mechanical schematism. But whatever Nock's methodology may be in general, one cannot but approve his occasional remarks, which are as much formulations of textual principles as statements of fact, such for example as that on page xiii, "the papyri have proved hundreds and hundreds of times that readings which are customarily neglected as being due to Byzantine scribes are, if not correct, at any rate ancient."

The amount of relevant and useful information about Hellenistic religious beliefs and terminology that is given in the commentary is astonishing. While it is true that the reader may be inconvenienced by sometimes having to look for explanatory notes several pages behind the passage to which they refer, this slight mechanical annoyance is abundantly compensated for by the instructiveness of these sought out comments. Incidentally, both Greek and Latin types are clear and pleasing.

Naturally, there are some places where a reader may differ with the editors about the choice of text or rendering, or where he would like to see additional commentary supplied, for example, on the origin of the name "Poimandres" or on the possibly biblical background of the *epipheromenon logon pneumatikon* in I.5. But these are only minor

defects in a work which a careful sampling shows to have been accomplished with brilliant success.

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Caste in India: Its Nature, Function, and Origins. By J. H. HUTTON. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York; The Macmillan Company, 1946. viii, 279 pp. $3.75.

The writer of this volume has had many years of administrative experience in India, has been a student of its social and religious institutions, and has written on particular tribes of north-eastern India. He wrote the Imperial Report of the Census of India for 1931.

Taking a sub-continental view of caste, of its variations, of the whole complex of society and of its religious beliefs, especially those which have a long sweep of historical significance, he handles his subject in the broadest possible way. He gives four chapters to background, and then analyzes caste under four heads; structure, strictures, sanctions, and functions. Then follows a consideration of origins under the titles: analogous institutions elsewhere, the traditional origin and its implications, other theories, factors in the emergency of caste and conclusion.

Caste is the evidence of how the peoples of varied origin who make up the population of India have evolved into an integrated, or organic, whole, still fluid in almost all details of its social and economic life, yet also one society.

In the extreme south there are, besides the pre-Dravidians, other peoples speaking Dravidian languages, among whom are some matriarchal practices. Isolated Malabar has been the stronghold of an ancient culture which predated the Aryan, with a matrilineal organization that has, until recently, been wellnigh universal. The peculiar Nayar-Nambudri-Brahman system contains both matrilineal and patrilineal elements. Among the castes of western India, Kunbis and others of importance practise hypergamy. In upper India, Brahmans are engaged in many occupations besides priestcraft: "It is probable that more than one racial element has gone into the composition of most Brahman castes, and perhaps they represent the priesthoods of what were once different, even antagonistic religions" (p. 29). The

Babhans (land-holders) and Bhats (genealogists) claim Brahman origin. Doms may have had an origin more honorable that their present status. Rajputs are of mixed origin. The Chuhra of the Panjab "is probably the parent caste of the Chamar. p. 34" (But the tanner is known in the Rigveda and the word *charmamla* belongs to that literature.) This great degree of racial mixture in castes of northern India is due to many invasions over a period of some thousands of years, and the endless mixture of race and of culture traits, where caste is most characteristic, must have had a profound effect, not only upon the composition of castes, but also upon their relative standings as well. Moreover,

> The system which has made it possible for so many and so different communities to live and develop together in common political units while retaining their own social systems and customs is the system of caste, and whatever drawbacks that system has and whatever injustices it involves, there can be no doubt but it has enabled the peoples of India to establish a stable society which has withstood and survived all military and political disturbances of some three thousand years (p. 39).

The *Varna* of Rigvedic society is not the same thing as caste. Those groups are now broken up into almost endless divisions and sub-divisions which function as castes today. Both hypogamous and hypergamous marriages are still practised, the latter more prevalent. The *gotra* is a strictly exogamous group among Brahmans, although the principle is followed even amongst the lowest castes. But, "Quite clearly the internal exogamy of Hindu castes is infinitely variable and every sort of system seems to be represented. . . . The *gotra* . . . is very far from being a stable institution of consistent pattern, even among Brahmans castes themselves" (p. 51). They (the *gotras*) are exogamous units of varied kinds, territorial, occupational, totemistic, often under a variety of names. "One fact remains more or less constant: the endogamous unit contains within it a number of exogamous units" (p. 51).

There are other restrictions on marriage such as consanguinity.

> Yet to this extent caste does govern marriage: caste is almost invariably endogamous and the subcaste very frequently so indeed; the caste either contains within itself exogamous subdivisions, or else observes certain rules restricting the choice of mates (p. 56).

Castes are certainly rising in the social scale. For example, the

Kayastha, which ranks next to Brahman in Bengal, is now commonly regarded as "twice-born," and itself claims to be Kshatriya, though it was perhaps more often regarded as a clean Sudra a hundred years ago and its status as twice-born is still disputed. They are probably really an occupational caste in origin, and as "writers" may have been recruited from more than one *varna* (p. 57).

Caste endogamy is more or less incidental to the taboo on taking cooked food by a person of, at any rate, a lower, if not any other caste, and, in the view of the author, this is the key-stone of the whole system. What is important is who *cooks* the food rather than who supplies it. There are variations in regulations about from whom water may be received, and restrictions on food cooked in water *(kachcha)* are much stricter than those for that cooked in ghi *(pakka)*. The taboos of any given caste or subcaste are liable to vary from one locality to another, and no general rule can be laid down, nor any scale of correspondence between social position and strictness of observance. There are regulations also about the materials from which eating and drinking vessels may be made, earthenware being denied to all higher castes. Regulations on smoking follow somewhat those regarding taking water.

Contact pollutions are observed, especially with reference to certain physical conditions and to certain occupations. This latter kind of contamination is less seriously considered now than formerly. Where restrictions are very rigid, as in the south, the details of regulations represent a long history of adjustment, with changes still going on. Death and the period of mourning result in other pollutions. There are also rights and prohibitions about clothes and the wearing of ornaments. Formerly, at least, language used in addressing members of certain castes depended both upon the status of the speaker and that of the addressed. Direct and indirect types of pollution show how intimate is the relation between caste and taboo. Penalties arising from infringement of taboos, or from change of occupation may result in the segregation of the group into affiliation with another caste already in existence or the creation of a new endogamous division within the original caste.

However important he may be, the Brahman's function in ruling on regulations of caste is "Only to declare if necessary what pattern of behavior has scriptural approval, or what expiations may be prescribed by religious authority or tradition" (p. 80). But this does not

make him the final authority in matters of caste. "It is probably significant of the true origin of the caste system that the ultimate controlling authority is secular, and further that the secular authority visualized as responsible in the ancient Hindu authorities is the king" (p. 81). Now the vast majority of caste matters are disposed of by the caste councils, *sahbas* and *panchayats,* the latter functioning in more restrict-areas in the north than in the south. "The jurisdiction of the panchayats [extends] to any matter in which the men of the caste consider that the interests or reputation of the caste require action to be taken against a member of the caste" (p. 89).

The punishments meted out by the councils begin with the usual one of forbidding the giving or receiving of the pipe in smoking. This automatically prohibits *kachcha* food and amounts to excommunication; ordinary services are consequently barred to the culprit. But punishments cover a wide range, both symbolic and practical.

The caste provides for the individual a secure place in society, while, at the same time, controlling almost all his behavior and contacts. It also prescribes, or limits, his choice of ritual to be observed at birth, initiation, marriage, and death. From the standpoint of the caste community, caste determines the membership of the caste and its position in society. Yet, in any given area, caste position is only roughly determined. The system enables the caste to act corporately. Castes do change their names for new ones, and thus in time, as new castes, secure better places in the social scale. New castes and subcastes with new occupations are appearing today.

"Caste is an unique institution found only in India, and the function which it has performed and still performs for Indian society as a whole is not found elsewhere" (p. 101). Among other things, "The caste system has afforded a place in society which any community, be it racial, social, occupational or religious, can be fitted as a cooperating part of the social whole, while retaining its own distinctive character and its separate individual life" (p. 101). Many tribes have in recent times become castes.

Caste is also a political stabilizer. "The reason for the social stability conferred by the caste system is no doubt its provision for the unlimited extension of the society by the inclusion as integral parts of the structure any number of extraneous, particularizing or segregative entities" (p. 106). It provides for the various functions necessary to

social life. It gives also a certain fluidity or mutability within itself.

There is for caste also a religious sanction. The doctrine of *karma* seems to help to maintain it; at least it is used effectively by the Brahman priesthood, and caste has been taken advantage of generally by the higher castes to the disadvantage of the lower. On the other hand, "A tribe which does not recognize Brahmans or Hinduism at all is generally in a better position socially with regard to the Brahman than the exterior castes whose occupations are degrading according to Hindu law and therefore polluting to Brahmans" (p. 110). Caste may be used as a screen and justification for priestly, anti-social conduct.

Further, as Furnivall agrees, such a system "Lacks a common will in economic life, and there is in consequence an absence of any common social demand; social wants are sectional and 'there is no social demand common to all the several elements' " (p. 112). Its method of transmitting a craft "makes an innovation in method appear sometimes as if it were a sin against the craftsman's ancestors" (p. 108). Besides, it tends "to stifle progress in economic life, giving it an almost paralysing stability" (p. 108).

One of the drawbacks of caste has been "the hardship which is entailed on generations of women in all those castes that aim at raising their position in the social scale" (p. 113), as, for example, in yielding to pressure for early marriage and forbidding the remarriage of widows. But it is in its treatment of outcasts that the working of the caste system is most open to criticism. In 1931, the "exterior" castes numbered 21% of the Hindu population.

The author says that the manifold origin of caste in India is the cause of its being unique. Hindu tradition traces the system to the four *varnas* of the Veda through mixture and remixture, so that now there are about 3,000 castes in all. To a large extent (theoretically) these were determined by whether the women married above or below their original status. The former enhanced, the latter degraded, the status of themselves and their offspring.

Pre-Vedic Hinduism has been as influential as Vedic Hinduism in the formation of caste. "Clearly there were Brahmans before the Rigvedic Aryans, and we must look for the origin of that caste partly no doubt in the priests of the Dravidian-speaking civilization . . ." (p. 132). The change from a matrilineal to a patrilineal system started in upper India. The same movement is seen in finding consorts for the

female deities of the indigenous population by the Vedic immigrants. This making over of society and of the pantheon gives significance to remains of matriarchal institutions in various parts of India today. The second, or colonizing stage, of the Aryan movement into India furnished the conditions for the amalgamation of the two peoples with an adjustment of the two systems. The author cites changes in the Tenth Book of the Rigveda, the Atharvaveda, and the Vasishtha-Visvamitra contest, with the latter's renunciation of Kshatriya ways, as marking the final ascendency of the pre-Aryan religion, as cases in point.

Many other items are brought into the speculation on the adjustment of races with different social systems. The practise of child marriage is much older than the Muslim invasion, being based upon the adjustments which the two social systems worked out in upper India. Another survival of matrilineal society is the *devadasi* system. There might have been in south India, within the matrilineal culture, antecedent to the infiltration of Rigvedic Hinduism there, some sort of caste system. The author's conclusion is:

> It would be rash to regard the caste system, as it has since developed, as a deliberate construction so much as the result of the reactions of indigenous institutions of taboo, pollution, purification and so forth to what was perhaps a conscious political or hierarchical policy adopted by the Rigvedic invaders and their successors towards the communities they found in the land (p. 145).

The chapter dealing with theories of caste, other than the author's own, is a concise summary useful for reference.

> It is urged emphatically that the Indian caste system is the natural result of the interaction of a number of geographical, social, political, religious, and economic factors not elsewhere found in conjunction. . . . [Historical factors have] resulted in the accumulation of a large number of societies of very different levels of culture and very varying customs in an area in which they have neither been mutually inaccessible, nor without some measure of individual isolation. . . . (pp. 163, 165).
>
> It is pretty clear that in previous attempts to account for caste insufficient importance has been attached, not only to geographical and migrational considerations and to the clash of matrilineal and patrilineal societies, but more particularly to that complex of beliefs in *mana,* taboo and magic which surrounds the primitive philosophy of soul stuff or life matter which is so widely spread and so deeply seated in the mainland of south-east Asia and in the islands of Indonesia and the Pacific (pp. 165f.).

To this study the author adds two appendices, which are abridgements of articles found in his *Imperial Report of the Census of India for 1931*. These are "The Position of the Exterior Castes" and "Hinduism and Primitive Religions." Both will be of service to those who do not have access to the more complete accounts in the *Report* itself.

The map is worthy of mention, but there are a few gaps in the bibliography.

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Autobiography of a Yogi. By PARAMHANSA YOGANANDA. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1946. xvi, 498 pp. $3.50.

The Paramhansa writes in an exuberant, often extravagant style, with which, judging from the long quotations from the diary of his companion, Mr. Wright, the latter may have had something to do. The author is not adverse to including in his comprehensive view a good many things from the West, quoting from Jewish and Christian scriptures to enforce some of his claims. There has been nothing before, written in English, or in any other European language, like this presentation of Yoga. It offers an opportunity for both extravagant praise and careful criticism.

While the Yogi holds to a specialized *Kriya Yoga,* he manages, in one place or another, to bring in every phase of the mystery of yoga, of which we have heard so much, both the commonplace and the extraordinary. This is not surprising, when one discovers that Yogananda is a very capable and enterprising propagandist who has established institutions for his Kriya Yoga both in India and in California.

His American adventure was foretold by his guru, Sri Yukteswar, who said to him: "The inflexible and the yielding methods are equally effective if applied with wisdom. You will go to foreign lands where blunt assaults on the ego are not appreciated. A teacher could not spread India's message in the West without an ample fund of accommodative patience and forebearance" (p. 126). The Yogi's comment is: "I refuse to state the amount of truth I later came to find in Master's words!" (p. 126). It was another of his teachers, Lahiri Mahasaya, who gave him his commission: "Go then to that far western land; spread there the creedless teaching of Kriya Yoga" (p. 353).

Yoga is a wonderful thing. It will even prepare the mind, unprepared by study, but with the aid of a teacher (guru) and a few days of coaching, to pass University examinations (p. 223). Sri Yukteswar said: "Not laziness but a burning zeal for God has prevented you from seeking college honors, . . . 'seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness; and all these things will be added unto you' " (p. 223). And, after the degree was won: "Get up, Mukunda," he (Sri Yukteswar) said indulgently, "the Lord simply found it more convenient to make you a graduate than to rearrange the sun and moon" (p. 227).

This Kriya Yoga is a lost, ancient science recovered by Babaji and imparted to Lahiri Mahasaya, who gave it to Sri Yukteswar. "It is a revival of the same science which Krishna gave, milleniums ago, to Arjuna, and which was later known to Patanjali, and to Christ, St. John, St. Paul, and other disciples" (p. 244). This system greatly shortens the long period leading to man's liberation. "*Kriya*, controlling the mind *directly* through the life force, is the easiest, most effective, and most scientific approach to the Infinite. In contrast to the slow, uncertain "bullock cart" theological path to God, *Kriya* may be called the "airplane route" (p. 249).

Babaji extended initiation to Moslems and Christians, and to persons holding all sorts of philosophical views. "He encouraged his various students to adhere to the good traditional disciplines of their own faith, giving them liberty to express their lives in compliance with environment and upbringing" (p. 331). This is a very liberal position. Still, real achievement in yoga, the reader will discover, rests back on the old, hard disciplines.

Since Yogananda does not give data on initiation, we have only what he gives in the way of description of his system of knowledge about Kriya Yoga.

The scientific technique of God-realization (p. 354).

A yogic technique whereby the sensory tumult is stilled, permitting man to achieve an ever-increasing identity with cosmic consciousness (p. 9. n.).

It calms the dualistic turmoil by a divine inner certainty (p. 193).

Kriya Yoga is a simple, psychophysical method by which the human blood is decarbonized and recharged with oxygen. The atoms of this extra oxygen are transmuted into life current to rejuvenate the brain and spinal centres. By stopping the accumulation of venous blood, the yogi is able to lessen and prevent the decay of tissues; the advanced yogi transmutes his cells into pure energy. Elijah, Jesus, Kabir and other prophets were past masters in the use of

Kriya or a similar technique by which they caused their bodies to dematerialize at will (pp. 243f.). It is the path to complete detachment.

Three gurus stand out in this autobiography: Babaji, Lahiri Mahasaya, and Sri Yukteswar.

Babaji, whom the Paramhansa refers to as "the Yogi-Christ of modern India, "is the ageless wonder and miracle, mahavatar, in constant communion with Christ. . . . That there is no historical reference to Babaji need not surprise us. The great guru has never openly appeared in any century" (p. 307). He moves with his disciples from place to place in the Himalayas, often by the method of astral travel, sometimes on foot, from peak to peak (p. 308). He can be seen or recognized by others only when he so desires. One disciple he brought back from the dead (p. 309). Babaji once materialized himself before a company in Moradabad (p. 324), and to the author, bidding him to go to America (p. 354).

Babaji's disciple, Lahiri Mahasaya, who carried on the Kriya Yoga, is a more interesting personality, perhaps because the Paramhansa speaks so intimately of their intercourse. Like Babaji, he is able to materialize himself at will (p. 8). He was a healer and gave sight to the blind. Amongst his miracles is the resurrection of Rama, a disciple (p. 300). He was able, in his own body, to work out the evil karma of some of his disciples (p. 347).

The most interesting of the three is Sri Yukteswar. His picture confirms the statements of his greatness. It is the finest portrait in the book. He is described as a strict but kindly guru, willing to overlook human frailties. He had great yogic powers and was able to impart the experience of "cosmic consciousness" (ch. 14). He made the interesting point that a man's horoscope is not a message of fate, but rather a challenge, since it is the result of his own past. "He can overcome any limitation, because he created it by his own actions in the first place, and because he has spiritual resources which are not subject to planetary pressure" (p. 169). He died at the age of eighty-one and was buried at Puri.

The author gives special reference to the resurrection of two of these gurus, devoting a whole chapter to that of Sri Yukteswar, who reappeared from the astral worlds. This chapter (43) contains an interesting theory of astral planets and causal spheres where liberated yogis dwell.

The author wanders so far afield in every direction that it is impos-

sible to organize his material into a brief review. The reader often wonders what he will say next as he proceeds. However, this is an unusual collection of claims, put together in clever fashion. The autobiography is not to be taken simply at its face value, for the Paramhansa has much to say that only the informed, the initiated, can understand. It is not as simple as it seems. He is sure to catch the unwary.

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Hindu Psychology: Its Meaning for the West. By SWAMI AKHILANANDA. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946. xviii, 241 pp. $2.50.

This valuable and illuminating book, by a monk of the Ramakrishna Order of India, comes to us sponsored by an eminent psychologist, Professor Gordon W. Allport, of Harvard, and an eminent philosopher, Professor Edgar Sheffield Brightman, of Boston University, who, in Introduction and Foreword, quite justly berate us for our ignorance and neglect of Oriental thought. And the Swami himself goes forthrightly about the task of removing some of this unfortunate *avidyā*.

In his survey of the history and development of Western and Hindu psychology, the author emphasizes their difference in origin, function, and method. In the West, of course, modern psychology is the child of philosophy and science, conceived in the desire for knowledge, advancing from lecture hall to laboratory and clinic, inheriting from its parents their hedonistic and mechanistic view of life. In India, on the contrary, psychology was the offspring of religion, born in the forest hermitage, and dedicated to the service of the Vedanta quest of union with the Absolute. It developed as a technique for achieving superconsciousness, and as a theory of the composite nature of man on which the yoga method is based. Its heritage was an ascetic and other-worldly philosophy of life. Considering their extreme disparateness of origin and purpose, it comes as something of a surprise to note how closely the latest developments in modern "depth" psychology have approached the Hindu pattern, in spite of its completely anthropocentric orientation.

The Swami is in agreement with the division of the mind into conscious and unconscious levels, but insists that the picture is defective—like a body without a head—because it denies the third plane of the

superconscious. He wholly rejects Jung's inclusion of superconscious elements in his racial or collective unconscious, in which the great spiritual archetypes are found in conjunction with the so-called primitive or instinctive elements. (Any student of comparative religion knows that these "higher" and "lower" elements of the religious consciousness *are* intertwined, e.g., the Kali cult with which the Swami as a disciple of Ramakrishna is quite familiar.) It would seem that, to a monistic religious philosophy, there is no reason at all for separating the two planes so arbitrarily. The dream experience, which belongs to the "unconscious" level, is a state of acute consciousness of *psychological* experience, and may be remembered with amazing clarity, just like the superconscious experience of the mystic. Is the difference one of kind, or only of degree? Many dreams have both the ineffable and noetic qualities of mystical experience, and produce the same effect of "Illumination," and even regeneration.

It is ironical that the psychologist who has the greatest knowledge and the most sympathetic understanding of the Oriental religions, namely C. G. Jung, should be singled out by Swami Akhilananda for special reproof. Considering the collaboration with Jung of such Orientalists as Richard Wilhelm, Wilhelm Hauer, and Heinrich Zimmer in the work of the Zürich Seminar, it can hardly be claimed that Jung's rejection of the yoga method is the result of ignorance. The Swami takes exception to Jung's opinion that the Oriental methods of meditation are unsuited to "Occidental types of mind," on the ground that there is no difference between Oriental and Occidental minds, and that the practice of meditation is found among the Christian mystics as well as in India. This is quite true, but the fact remains that the Westerner is oriented by the pattern of his culture to a more active and extroverted way of life, and it seems to be only the monastics who are actually able to practice the "way of meditation" to any great extent. Also, from the point of view of Jungian psychology, the aim is "individuation" and not identification of the soul with the Absolute—a therapeutic and not a religious aim—and naturally the method of systematic introversion and "free phantasy" is more conducive to insight into one's personal problems than the "one-pointed" meditation of the yoga discipline. After all, the aim of psychoanalysis is part of our Hellenic heritage, and hence humanistic. The slogan for Western man is still, "Know *Thyself*."

There are one or two points on which the Swami does not seem to understand Jung's position very clearly, for example, the "racial" unconscious. On page 68 he says, "The contents of such dreams cannot be traced . . . to any form of personal or 'racial' unconscious, as Professor Jung would want us to believe. The dreamers have had unique experiences which cannot be traced to the race in which they were born." Exactly so, and it is this very fact which brought Jung to the study of Oriental religious symbolism in search of the meaning of certain symbols appearing in the dreams of his European patients, and to the formulation of his hypothesis (not dogma, be it said) of a universal "racial" unconscious, meaning the whole human race, and no one special race. Truly, in the collective unconscious "there is neither East nor West."

We are greatly indebted to Swami Akhilananda for making so crystal clear the fundamental differences between Western and Oriental psychology, thereby helping us to discriminate between those elements in Hindu psychology which it is possible, and desirable, for us to assimilate into our own way of life and those which are wholly incompatible with our world-view. One of these fundamental differences, it seems to me, is that of time-sense. To the Hindu, with his cyclic view of eternal recurrence in the cosmic scheme and innumerable incarnations for the individual, there is little sense of urgency. For him it makes little difference whether badly needed social reforms are brought about in our century or some other (they will come eventually, or, after all, does it really matter?), and for the individual it is quite in order to spend any number of lives if necessary in the development of superconsciousness so that, eventually, he may become a savior of mankind. But in the West, where time is linear and we have only one short life in which to accomplish our ends, the sense of urgency is intense—there is so much needing to be done, so little time to do it in, and so few laborers for the harvest! Of course it is futile to allow oneself to be irritated by the Hindu's bland contempt for the "social gospel"—futile, alas, but practically unavoidable! In Chapter X, the Swami twits us with the fact that we "seem to think that the most important fact of religious life is to do good to others," forgetting that the *first* commandment is to "love the Lord thy God." In quoting the second commandment the Swami omits the rather crucial words, "which is like unto it."

However, in all honesty we are obliged to admit our tendency to overvaluate the "Marthas" and undervaluate the "Marys." There

should be room for both in our society, and Jung himself has warned us often enough of the dangers of the over-extroverted attitude. And it is only just to give due credit to Swami Nikhilananda and his Ramakrishna Order for their practical as well as theoretical acceptance of the path of *Karma Yoga* as a way of salvation. But it is illuminating to note that even the great Vivekananda, apostle of *Karma Yoga,* says of service to the poor, "Do it only as a worship. I should see God in the poor, and it is *for my salvation* that I go and worship them" (italics mine). One rather misses the human warmth and tenderness of the Good Samaritan! It may well be that we of the West neglect the First Commandment to our eternal peril, but one is forced to ask quite seriously whether, in the Hindu religious pattern, the Second Commandment does not suffer a certain amount of neglect.

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Am I my Brother's Keeper? By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. New York: The John Day Company, 1947. xiii, 110 pp. $4.50.

The importance of this small volume may be judged by the length of the present review. The book contains seven short essays, all reprints with slight revisions. The last is a very condensed résumé of a paper, "On the One and Only Transmigrant," which, in view of its central significance for the author's philosophy, we wish had been included in toto. However, Dr. Coomaraswamy promises that its thesis will be "more fully developed, with adequate documentation, in a work on reincarnation to be completed shortly"* (footnote 2, p. 110). All the papers were published in 1943 or later, thus showing the author's maturest reflection. Many notes and references have been added; in fact there are 196 of them, one of the essays containing no less than 86; the author's learning is astounding. Yet his breadth of scholarship has not a whit decentralized the thought behind it. Quite the opposite: he finds in all fields—art, ritual, daily work, philosophy—"paths that lead to the same summit," to the One ultimate being. It is notable that he takes art in its original sense of *making:* "agriculture and cookery, weaving and fishing are just as much arts as painting and music" (p. 5).

* The following review was written some time before Dr. Coomaraswamy's lamented death. The writer wishes to record here his judgment that we of the West have lost a pre-eminent messenger of truth from the East.

The book opens with an Introduction by R. A. Parker (pp. vii-xiii) which seems to be rather more harmful than helpful. One gets from it the impression of Coomaraswamy as just a hostile critic of the modern West, particularly of the U.S.A.; the positive note of his teaching, though mentioned, is hardly emphasized enough. The reader who does not know our author's work in the past will tend to rate him as one of those contemptuous foreign critics of our ways whom we generously harbor in our midst. To be sure, he *is* a hostile critic; he belabors us for thinking the East too backward to teach us anything. But he is so much more that we cannot fail to see through the apparent hostility to the friendliness beneath—a friendliness that goes with the doctrine of the One Spirit in all men. Still we are indebted to Mr. Parker for something of his personal history: we of the West set high store on the person, in contrast with the superpersonal Atman. That there is no *necessary* opposition between these attitudes of East and West, is, indeed, part of the author's message. Even so, sometimes his words cause us to wonder if there is not as much of exclusion in the Oriental as he finds in the Occidental attitude. Does he, as an orthodox Hindu, believe that the West has something unique and positive to teach the East? The number of Occidentals is increasing—particularly among the professional philosophers—who believe that the East has much to teach the West. Would the believer in Brahm and Atman admit the converse? On the whole, yes, in the case of our author, we think; his is the *spirit* of all-inclusiveness. Yet so often he *writes* as if penning an "indictment of modern Western civilization" (Parker's phrase, p. vii) which finds little if any positive good in it. In order to judge as best we may how far the indictment goes, let us treat first the essays that seem to take a more hostile-critical position. These are the first, second, fourth, and fifth, and of them the first and fourth appear the more pessimistic about Western prospects. So we begin with these two.

Essay I, giving the book its title and therefore presumably giving its most emphatic message, is strongly put. It begins

> Cain, who killed his brother Abel the herdsman and built himself a city, prefigures modern civilization, one that has been described from within as "a murderous machine with no conscience and no ideals," "neither human nor normal nor Christian" and in fact "an anomaly, not to say a monstrosity." It has been said: "The values of life are slowly ebbing. There remains the show of civilization, without any of its realities." Criticisms such as these could be cited without end. Modern civilization, *by its divorce from any principle,* can

be likened to a headless corpse of which the last motions are convulsive and insignificant (p. 1, italics added).

Is the last sentence a résumé of other men's views, or the author's own view? Read on.

Modern civilization takes for granted that people are better off the more things they want and are able to get; its values are quantitative and material. Here, How much is he worth? means How much money has he got? (p. 2).

And

. . . an incessant "progress" never ending in contentment, means the condemnation of all men to a state of irremediable poverty" (pp. 2f.).

And

if reading and writing are to enable the Indian and Chinese masses to read what the Western proletariat reads, they will remain better off, from any cultural point of view, with their own more classical literature of which all have oral knowledge (p. 3).

We can only say that if the Western races are in the future to do anything for the peoples whose cultures have been broken down in the interests of commerce and "religion," they must begin by renouncing what has aptly been called their "proselytizing fury" (p. 4).

The bases of modern civilization are to such a degree rotten to the core that it has been forgotten even by the learned that man ever attempted to live otherwise than by bread alone (p. 6).

Mrs. Handy's record of the Marquesas Islanders, that "the external aspects of their culture have been almost wiped out by the white man's devastating activities," is typical of what could be cited from a hundred other sources (p. 7).

more loveless, and at the same time more sentimentally cynical culture than that of modern Europe and America it would be impossible to imagine (p. 8).

What you call your "civilizing mission" is in our eyes nothing but a form of megalomania. Whatever we need to learn from you, we shall come to ask you for as the need is felt. At the same time, if you choose to visit us, you will be welcome guests, and if there is anything of ours that you admire, we shall say "It is yours" (p. 10).

Well, all this seems to find little of value in our Western civilization. And the indictment is two-fold: it condemns not only the "bases of modern civilization" but also the *attitude* of that civilization toward the cultures of the East. Note in the above quotations: "they must be-

gin by renouncing their proselytizing fury"; "what you call your civilizing mission is in our eyes nothing but a form of megalomania." Also "it is not, however, of suicide, but of murder that we propose to speak" (p. 1); not merely that modern civilization is like "a headless corpse of which the last motions are convulsive," but also that it is trying to *kill* the culture of the East with the "relentless march of Westernization" (p. 2). And "There is no people in the whole of Asia that does not look upon Europe with fear and suspicion" (quoted, p. 2, from Tagore). "O. L. Reiser assumed that after the war American ideals and policies . . . would dominate the world" (p. 3); "behind all this there is a fanaticism . . . , away with any sort of wisdom that is not of its own date and kind and the product of its own pragmatic calculations" (p. 9). And finally, "All that can only be atoned for by repentance, recantation and restitution" *(ibid.)*. "These principles on which the 'unspoiled' life of the East is still supported must at least be grasped, respected, and understood if ever the Western provincial is to become a citizen of the world" (p. 10).

If the above offers little but condemnation, we find a few sentences toward the end, perhaps on the other side of the ledger. "If ever the gulf between East and West . . . is to be bridged, it will be only by an agreement on principles" (p. 10). Now Platonic philosophy is a western affair, having long been highly respected in Europe and later in America, and "A philosophy identical with Plato's is still a living force in the East" (p. 11). Here, then, is a bond of union. The Western idealist or spiritualist *can* appreciate the East, and, conversely, the Eastern can join hands with the Western. Nor is this to say that the Western way of expressing that idealism is wrong. "To propose an agreement on principles does not involve or imply that the Western world should be Orientalized; propaganda is out of the question as between gentlemen, and everyone must make use of the forms appropriate to his own psychophysical constitution" (p. 11). And "I am far from believing that the European is incapable of goodness" *(ibid.)*.

True then, our author does concentrate on the faults of the West and particularly on its failure to understand and appreciate the East, and so far says nothing about the need of the East to understand the West. But we cannot conclude from this that he quite disvalues the latter. It is a matter of the needs of the time. The West *has* exploited the East. The East has *not* exploited the West. Surely it is our duty in

the West to abandon this attitude. Surely it is as wicked as it is short-sighted to indulge the "proselytizing fury," the "fanaticism" that would "away with any sort of wisdom not of its own date and kind." Also, with many of the aspersions of our civilization in this essay this reviewer and probably not a few others in the Western hemisphere would agree. We would still claim that there are valuable insights native to West rather than East, insights novel and distinct, *not just different ways of seeing one and the same truth;* that each hemisphere, each mode of thought, has contributed its indispensable quota to the cause of proper living. The evils of our American progress-philosophy, naturalism, humanism, and the like, do not render them worthless; there is much in them which may be of great benefit to humanity—so we may believe while yet feeling the beauty and dignity of the Eastern modes of life.

The fourth essay, *Eastern Wisdom and Western Knowledge,* calls attention to the work of René Guénon, which is in like vein to our author's. Notice the protest against Western "temporalism." "For the Hindu, the events of the Rgveda are nowever [sic] and dateless, and the Krishna Līlā 'not an historical event'; and the reliance of Christianity upon supposedly historical 'facts' seems to be its greatest weakness" (p. 56). And "it is from metaphysics that the West has turned away in its desperate endeavor to live by bread alone" (p. 59); "this metaphysics survives as a living power in Eastern societies, insofar as they have not been corrupted by the withering touch of . . . *modern* civilization" *(ibid.)* "He (Guénon) does not mean . . . that Europeans ought to become Hindus or Buddhists, but much rather that they . . . should rediscover Christianity, or what amounts to the same thing, Plato ('that great priest' as Meister Eckhart calls him)" *(ibid.)* Nevertheless (quoting Guénon), "It is the West that must take the initiative, but she must be prepared really to go towards the East, not merely seeking to draw the East towards herself, as she has tried to do so far" (p. 62). The West must learn to "recognize in the Christian tradition an embodiment of the universal truth to which God has never nor anywhere left himself without a witness" (p. 64); "a traditional wisdom that is no more essentially Oriental than it is Occidental" *(ibid.).*

Perhaps essay II, "The Bugbear of Literacy," will be the most startling to us of the democratic West: "there is no necessary connection of literacy with culture, and to impose our literacy (and our contempo-

rary 'literature') upon a cultured but illiterate people is to destroy their culture in the name of our own" (p. 21). "Universal compulsory education . . . has created readers of the yellow press and cinema-goers" (quoted from K. Otten, p. 23). "The written text, as Plato says, *can* serve those whose memories are weakened by old age" (p. 28). Two evils in particular are produced by compulsory literacy: loss of memory and dislike of manual work: "There are hundreds of thousands of Indians even now who daily repeat from knowledge by heart either the whole or some large part of the Bhagavad Gītā" (p. 27); and on the other hand, the schools turn out " 'educated' persons . . . who think themselves superior to manual work and want to follow only commercial or intellectual callings" (quoted from A. Schweizer, p. 29). These forget that "Christ was a carpenter and the son of a carpenter" *(ibid);* and—may this reviewer add—Christ wrote nothing. "There is not much real difference between the Germans' will to enforce their culture upon the backward races of the rest of Europe and our determination to enforce our own upon the rest of the world; the methods employed in their case may be more evidently brutal, but the kind of will involved is the same" (p. 31). Let us all take these words to heart.

After all, declares essay V, "East and West," the real conflict is not so much between two geographical areas as between the tradition of spiritualism, and modernism; between "the great tradition of the magnanimous philosophers whose philosophy was also a religion that had to be lived if it was to be understood" and "the modern and irregular way of life that now prevails in the West" (p. 66). Yet even in the West this tradition has survived, this doctrine of the Universal Self present in each man. To see that East and West have thus a common store of wisdom, however, are needed "philosophers or scholars, if such are to be found, who are more than philologues and to whom their knowledge of the great tradition has been a vital and transforming experience" (p. 67). "How many of our 'communists,' I wonder, realize that the reference of 'the common man,' *communis homo,* was originally not to the man in the street as such, but to the immanent deity, the very Man in everyman!" (p. 68). But to realize the inherent dignity of every vocation, of work in every station, is the first step toward this consummation. And that is the *intention* of the caste system of India; "only when the *intentions* of the traditional 'caste' systems have been understood" (p. 71), can this step be taken. For, when all is said and

done, "the backward East, in so far as it is still 'backward,' is very much happier, calmer, and less afraid of life and death than the 'forward' West has ever been or can be" (p. 72).

Less condemning of this same West, more hopeful of a mutual understanding, are the three remaining essays. The third, "Paths that Lead to the Same Summit," hopes for "active alliances—let us say of Christianity and Hinduism or Islam, on the basis of commonly recognized first principles" (p. 40). And the author strikingly says of the quarrel between religions "nor will he (the Oriental) participate in such a quarrel; much rather he will say, what I have often said to Christian friends, 'Even if you are not on our side, we are on yours'" (p. 43). Quotations in the same vein follow—taken from Eastern philosophers. "There are many paths that lead to the summit of one and the same mountain; their differences will be the more apparent the lower down we are, but they vanish at the peak" (p. 50).

Essay VI, "Spiritual Paternity and the Puppet Complex," finds the old belief that the conception of a child is from the spirit-world in Australians, Pacific Islanders, Buddhists, Aristotle, Dante, Bonaventura, and the Upanishads. The ceremony of puppet-dancing is "a carrying over of the vital principle of resignation" (p. 82). "If I seem to move of my own will, this is only true to the extent that I have identified myself and all my being and willing with the Puppeteer's who made and moves me" (p. 85). True it is that "the various human cultures are only the dialects of one and the same spiritual language" (p. 81). This essay is the one with 86 footnotes and many more references, showing the incredible extent of the author's mastery of the field of art.

The final essay, "Gradation, Evolution, and Reincarnation," is well placed at the end; it states in extremely condensed form something of the metaphysic hinted at above. "The so-called conflicts of religion and science are for the most part the result of a mutual misunderstanding of their respective terms and range . . . ; one deals . . . with intangibles, the other with things that can be measured, whether directly or indirectly" (p. 104). God's creation of the universe was (is) a timeless affair, whereas "empirical observation is always of things that change, that is, of individual things or classes of things" (p. 105). "Reincarnation—as currently understood to mean the return of individual souls to other bodies here on earth—is not an orthodox Indian doctrine, but only a popular belief" (p. 106). "The Lord is the only transmi-

grant. That art thou—the very Man in everyman" (p. 107). See, then, the inclusive position of Dr. Coomeraswamy, for he says: "This is the traditional doctrine, not of 'reincarnation' in the popular and animistic sense, but of the transmigration and evolution of 'the ever-productive Nature'; it is one that in no way conflicts with or excludes the actuality of the process of evolution as envisaged by the modern naturalist" (p. 108).

This little work is of the first importance for thoughtful minds in the Western world today.

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Four Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars. By Eleanor Shipley Duckett. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. x, 488 pp. $5.00.

In this volume we have an account of the lives and the work of four Anglo-Saxons: Aldhelm of Malmesbury (*ca.* 670-709), Wilfrid of York (634-709), Bede of Jarrow (673[?]-735), and Boniface of Devon (?-754) —all of them, save Bede, called the "Venerable" and declared to be a Doctor of the Church, canonized by the Church, and all commemorated in the Anglican Missal (Bede and Boniface in the Roman Missal as well).

Here within little over a century, we find four great worthies of the Church in England, each distinguished for devotion and learning, each filled with asceticism and fervor for the Catholic Faith, yet each differing widely in talent and activity.

Aldhelm, Abbot of Malmesbury, and, for the last four years of his life, Bishop of Sherborne, was primarily a scholar. Gifted with a keen critical and literary sense, he was the first Anglo-Saxon to write Latin verse, among his compositions being a hundred riddles so dear to his people's mind. It is most probable that he wrote in Anglo-Saxon also, though these works have long since vanished. His Latin style, highly involved, shows many traces of "Hisperic" diction, full of artificial neologisms, reminiscent of such Irish productions as the famous *Hisperica Famina* ("Irish Sayings"). This is significant. Aldhelm's teacher, and his predecessor as Abbot of Malmesbury, Máeldubh, was Irish, and from him Aldhelm doubtless absorbed much of the Irish spirit. The Irish Church, indeed, long exercised a profound influence in England, and the distinctive Celtic tenets, the tonsure and the dating of Easter, were eradicated only slowly and with difficulty. Aldhelm, however,

seems never to have been touched by these heresies, but adhered firmly to the teachings of the Roman Church, even without the influence of his teachers at Canterbury, Archbishop Theodore and Abbot Hadrian. It must also be noted that he had a fine aesthetic taste in architecture and designed many churches of great beauty.

Like Aldhelm, Wilfrid, Abbot of Ripon and Bishop of York, came first under the influence of the Celtic Church at Lindisfarne, but, almost before he reached manhood, Canterbury and Rome had won him enthusiastically and finally to the Papal Obedience. His life was one of great vicissitudes after his episcopal consecration at Compiègne in 644, and even after his translation to the see of York in 669—imprisonments, wanderings in Frisia, Mercia, Sussex, Wessex, mainly because of his opposition to the division of his see by Theodore of Canterbury. Learned and brilliant, he was ambitious and unyielding. In revulsion, it may be, from the asceticism and austerity of the Celtic Church, and inspired by the splendor of the Roman rite, enhanced by a native artistic sense, he gave such rein to his love of outward magnificence and luxury—though all to the glory of God and His Church, not for his own vanity—that he roused the jealousy even of royalty; his was a life of tragedy, deeply troubled by misunderstanding and ingratitude for his very real devotion and service to the Faith. Never really happy (except at Rome) away from his native Northumbria, for which he declined Strasbourg and even Canterbury, he was destined to spend weary years abroad, but, despite his long exile, he was ever a true Englishman.

In Bede, the "Venerable," and famed as the author of the *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglicanae,* which makes him indeed "the Father of English History," we have, not a churchman of exquisite literary taste, and not a wanderer and strong-willed but unfortunate Bishop, devoted to the adornment and beauty of Holy Church, but a sedentary scholar who never went farther than York from Jarrow and Wearmouth. Unlike the three others, his life was calm and quiet, spent in study and writing amid a rich library, and, good Englishman though he was, and no lover of the Celts, there are traces of Celtic Christianity in his works. A voluminous writer, his exegeses are strongly touched by allegory. Of his works and of their spirit Miss Duckett gives a full analysis. Suffice it here to say that they include, besides the *History,* text-books, science (especially chronology), hagiology, homilies, some letters, and (perhaps) a penitential.

The fourth here considered is a missionary, the renowned Boniface, whose original name was Winfrid, the "Apostle of Germany." Of noble birth like Aldhelm and Wilfrid, and deeply learned like all three, he seemed destined for high ecclesiastical rank in his native land, but he felt called to convert the heathen on the continent. For a time he was in Thuringia, then in Frisia and Hesse. In 722 or 723 he was consecrated Bishop, and in 732 he was elevated to the Archbishopric, though without a special see; then he was once more in Hesse, where he felled the famous oak of Geismar, and again in Thuringia. In 742, his archepiscopal see was defined as Austrasia. Despite all obstacles, whether of the heathen or of Celtic or Frankish clergy, he continued his missionary activity until he died a martyr's death at Dokkum (near Leeuwarden) June 5, 754, and his tomb at Fulda is still the place of meeting for the Bishops of Germany. His busy life left scant leisure for literary work, apart from his voluminous letters; he might have been a great scholar, and had begun with a grammar and riddles, but gave up all for the glory of God and the extension of His Kingdom.

Of all these men the lives have been written many times both in medieval and in modern days, but never, perhaps, as here in full relation to their age and all who surrounded them; written, too, with a rare beauty of style and a deeply reverent understanding of the Catholic Faith. The "Dark Ages" were not wholly dark as regards that Faith!

Few are the flaws which even this reviewer can find. He admits that he has not verified every reference nor checked the ample bibliography, but these omissions do not disturb him here. He merely remarks—since a critic is expected to find some fault—that there seems to be a serious *petitio principii* in assuming (pp. 4-6) that Máeldubh was from Bangor, near Belfast Lough. Personally, he would have retained John Mason Neale's well-known rendering of the hymn from the Bangor Antiphonar, *Sancti, venite, Christi Corpus sumite* (p. 6): "Draw nigh, and take the Body of the Lord"; he does not find an Old Latin *in carne* for the Vulgate *in carcere* (I Peter 3: 19) recorded by Sabatier except for Bede himself (p. 270-71); and (p. 311, note 219, and p. 466, line 22) one should read *Prosa* instead of *Poesie.*

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The Correspondence of Sir Thomas More. Edited by ELIZABETH ROGERS. Princeton University Press, 1947. xxiii, 584 pp. $7.50.

More and Erasmus, intimate in life, are closely associated also in the editing of their letters. The Rogers edition of More's correspondence should stand beside the Allen edition of the epistles of Erasmus, partly because More's apologies for Erasmus are necessary for the understanding of his controversies, but more especially because the More volume does not repeat his correspondence with Erasmus already available in the Allen edition. Not only the subject matter but also the style unites the works. The More letters are equipped with the same footnote biographies to which the reader of the Allen Erasmus has become accustomed. In both the rule obtains that epistolary dedications are to be treated as letters. Hence in this collection one has, for example, the preface to the *Utopia.*

The More correspondence is not extensive, only one volume, a trifling residue compared with the tomes of Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin. The reason is that many of More's papers were confiscated at the time of his execution, but what remains is representative. There are literary letters in which the humanist, with somewhat fulsome urbanity, lauds his friends and defends their achievements. Even where defense must be polemical, the tone is always decorous. There are political letters. The affairs of England in relation to France, Spain, Scotland and the Empire are mirrored in these pages. More at times appears as a spirited patriot quite in contrast to Erasmus, who always cared more for Europe than for Holland. And there are domestic letters, especially at the end. A right Christian letter was sent by Sir Thomas to his lady on the news of the loss of their barns and "corn." He suggests that she take the family to church for a service of thanksgiving to Him who has given and who has taken away, and who knows that at times loss is more to be esteemed than gain. On More's domestic relations there is a charming note in the preface to the *Utopia.* More apologizes for delays occasioned in part by the king's business but also by chatting with his wife and family, "which also is necessary if one would not be a stranger in one's own household."

For the historian of the Reformation, the most important letters are those which concern themselves directly with the religious issues of the day, the letters to Bugenhagen and Fryth, and the correspondence of More with his daughters on the eve of the end. In the controversy

with the Protestant reformers More forsakes his urbanity. *Humanitas* was for him, as in antiquity, the code of an aristocracy, of gentlemen loyal to state and church. It does not extend to those beyond the pale. Irony and rough invective are the only appropriate weapons in dealing with such monsters as Luther or Bugenhagen. More, despite his breadth at other points, could not regard clerical marriage as other than adultery. Any disruption of the corps of Christendom was rebellion against God. The theological issues were not really grasped, for example Luther's doctrine of justification by faith in relation to his view of free will. Luther, of course, had himself largely to blame for the misunderstanding. He was so fearful of cowardice in failing to make his position unequivocably plain that he would overleap his steed and state his conviction in terms far exceeding his habitual thought. The famous passage in his tract "On the Enslaved Will," in which he says that man is like a donkey, ridden now by God and now by the devil, was most unfortunate, because it suggests, as More charged, that man is a mere automaton. Yet such was not Luther's view. His point was that nothing that man can do—and he can do much—will have any effect upon his destiny. This lies wholly in the hands of God. Neither More nor Erasmus grasped the full import of this point.

In one respect More's polemic against Luther fails to anticipate modern Catholic criticism. Maritain rails against Luther as a great irrationalist. Luther did indeed say that the most fundamental tenets of Christianity exceed human comprehension. The doctrine of the Trinity, for example, is not amenable to the rules of ordinary arithmetic. But Maritain's vilification of Luther would apply equally well to Saint Thomas More, who declared that the doctrine of the real presence in the sacrament is not rationally defensible, but must be believed despite the cavils of reason.

There is a minor point in More's letter to Bugenhagen which puzzles the editor, namely the twitting of Bugenhagen for arrogating to himself the title of bishop. The suggestion is made that the allusion may be to some remark such as that of Luther ten years later when he pointed to Bugenhagen as a bishop among the Wittenbergers. But nothing so specific need be discovered to explain the reference. As early as 1521 the early meaning of the word *episcopos* was revived. In the primitive church the bishop was simply a pastor. Hence, while Luther was still at the Wartburg, one man called himself the bishop of Lochau, another the bishop of Torgau, and so on.

The moving passages in which More defended to his daughter Margaret his resolve to refuse the oath and suffer at the stake have all the ring of Luther's utterances at Worms, or of his first sermons on his return, in which he declared that no one can live or die for another, but each must stand by his own faith. After these four hundred years the martyrs on both sides of that ancient controversy appear singularly alike. The similarity between all martyrs appears the more striking in our own day, when so many millions have suffered without benefit of martyrdom. We wonder why those former contestants, being so alike, could not have composed their differences. But common ground is necessary for any first rate quarrel, and those who are most loyal to their limited lights are always the most implacable. Those who will die may also kill, and the final word to write over the Reformation is "tragedy."

And now permit me to offer a supplementary letter which the modesty of Professor Rogers forbade her to include. It is from Saint Thomas More in paradise to Elizabeth Rogers at Chambersburg. The letter is undated, but internal evidence suggests April, 1948. It reads:

I am very beholden to you, myne hertly beloved syster, for the paynes long bestowed vpon the poore remayns of your beedman. Hit maketh me fulle ioyfull that the vyndicacion of the esteemed Erasmus bee more wydely reade, and perchaunce the words I hadde with Margaret when I was resolved to stand, yet uncertain whether I should faint and fall, may confyrme the wavering in a tyme of faltering fayth. Therefore, syster, I thank you.

In goostly frendshyp your brother
Thomas More.

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Religion in Economics: A Study of John Bates Clark, Richard T. Ely, and Simon N. Patten. By JOHN RUTHERFORD EVERETT. New York: King's Crown Press, 1946. xiii, 160 pp. $2.25.

This study was written as a Ph.D. thesis for Columbia University. It is designed as an investigation of the relationship between religion and economic theory in the work of three American economists of the last generation: John Bates Clark, Richard T. Ely, and Simon N.

Patten. They have been chosen for consideration because they represent three different types of American economic and religious thought. The author seeks to, "provide a corrective for the general disregard of the religious factor in the historical study of economic doctrine," and more specifically to show the way in which these three economists utilize religion. To accomplish this purpose, Dr. Everett devotes the major portion of his work to an expository development relating the standard economic writings of each author with his religious ideas. It is his hope that "this essay will fill a small but important gap in the history of American religion and economic theory, and that it may offer a warning to those who would consider economic theories in themselves and apart from the aims, ideals, and biographies of the men who create them." In each of these respects this study is highly successful.

The introduction begins with a brief reconstruction of the conditions existing in America between 1870 and 1900—the period in which Clark, Ely, and Patten formulated their social theory. This was the "golden age" that saw a rapid growth of both "triumphant industrialism" and social evil. It was the age of political corruption, crafty trusts, and growing labor unrest. But, as the author points out, it was also the age of Henry Adams, William James, Lester Ward, Ralph Ingersoll, Washington Gladden, and a host of others who were shaping new intellectual movements and bringing "the first real attempts on the part of Americans to come to grips with American problems." In this period American social theory was awakened from complacency. The combination of Darwinian and Spencerian evolutionary conceptions (popularized by such men as John Fiske and Edward L. Youmens) brought a new revolutionary sweep of naturalistic theory into philosophy and the social sciences. The introductory notes conclude with a glance at the secular social theories emerging from these backgrounds, giving particular attention to the thought of Henry George and William Graham Sumner.

The main body of the study consists of three chapters—one devoted to each of the men under consideration. In each case a biographical sketch precedes the expository material, tracing the influence experienced by the economist in his formative years. The author could have done his readers a greater service had he woven into the text something more of the attainments and influence of these men in later life. That

Simon N. Patten has had contemporary influence on New Deal social planners is given a one sentence notation in the preface; that Richard T. Ely is regarded as the father of much of Wisconsin's progressive legislation of the LaFollette era and was the teacher of such men as Woodrow Wilson and many present day economists is not mentioned; likewise, the reader of this study will not learn from it such pertinent facts as that John B. Clark was for twenty-eight years professor of Economics at Columbia University, nor that for a period of more than ten years after the turn of the century his system dominated the economic thinking of America. While it is not the author's purpose to write biographies of Clark, Ely, and Patten, it would have greatly added to the reader's perspective had he included more of this material.

Dr. Everett does an excellent job of relating religious concepts to economic theory in the thought of these men. But, without further relating that economic theory to its practical accomplishments and influence there remains the tendency of evaluating the religious concepts in an incomplete context. Each of these economists sought to make religious insights effective determinants in enhancing the patterns of social organization. In a measure they were successful. They were successful at least in fostering a dynamic reorientation of religious concern. This reviewer feels that these considerations should figure more largely in the critical evaluation, despite those aspects of their theology that make them suspect in these latter days.

John B. Clark is regarded by many competent persons as the greatest of American theoretical economists. His contributions to neo-classical economic theory, as one of the founders of the Marginal Utility school, brought him world recognition. This study makes it clear, however, that he was not only a technical economist but a social philosopher, and that perhaps this is his greatest contribution. Richard T. Ely is aptly called "the prophet of religious economics." He had a great influence upon the religious community of the nation and became "the acknowledged standard-bearer for the American school of 'ethical economists.'" He and Clark held similar points of view, but there are radical differences. Together they form two different parts of one pattern. They both held to the traditional supernatural interpretation of religion, but they did so as liberal rather than orthodox Christians. Clark places strong emphasis on an external, descriptive natural law. He sought to order the institutional structure of society so that

the natural moral law could operate effectively. Ely, on the other hand, says little about natural law; his concern is with an internal, prescriptive moral law which finds its highest expression in the true Christian. Converted individual members of society are the leaven by which the social structure is transformed. Simon N. Patten, "the theologian of religion in economics," stands in contrast to Clark and Ely. It was his conviction that all religious thought is economically determined. Formulating a concept of "epochal history" he attempts to correlate the economic conditions of each epoch with its economic, aesthetic, moral, and religious ideas. These ideals grow out of the economic conditions of each epoch, and new epochs require new ideals. Conversion for Patten becomes a turning from the old ideals to the new. The ideals to which an American of the twentieth century should be converted are those of co-operation and social salvation.

Thus it becomes apparent that while Clark, Ely, and Patten represent three different types of religious and economic thought, yet they stand together as representatives of one kind of reaction from the deterministic and materialistic secular economic theory of their day. It is the reaction of moral voluntarism.

In brief concluding notes Dr. Everett weighs the subjects of his study in the balance and finds them wanting. Though not labeled, the balance is clearly that of contemporary "Christian realism." The economists are criticised for misunderstanding an essential element in the religious tradition they attempt to affirm, namely, the fall of man from essential goodness into ambiguity and existential evil. Furthermore, they failed to realized that, "the great function of all religious traditions is to give a transcendent peace that goes beyond the tragedy of historical existence." Having fallen into the easy optimism of nineteenth century progressivist thought, they are indicted for pulling the Kingdom of God out of heaven and placing it on earth at the end of a steady upward march. "The solutions to the economic problem offered by these men," writes Dr. Everett, "is nothing short of social magic."

Such criticism has an alarming poignancy in our times. But, after that has been said, there remains the insight that Clark, Ely, and Patten had into the function of religious faith. In its light, transcendent peace and fulfillment beyond history have only speculative interest in those idle hours when ultimates soar out beyond the demands and

decisions of our corporate life, which cry out to tell us that ultimates are as nothing if they have no relevance here.

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New York City

Evil and the Christian Faith. By NELS F. S. FERRÉ. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947. xi, 173 p. $2.50.

This is the second volume of Professor Ferré's emerging *magnum opus,* which is to be called *Reason and the Christian Faith.* It is the first specific discussion of the problem of evil in his published work to date, and it serves to amplify and extend his theological perspective still more comprehensively. Although it is a relatively brief essay, it succeeds better than any of his other volumes in exhibiting the remarkable range and depth of his practical wisdom and the integrity of his eager and affirmative Christian spirit. He tells us that "this volume gives the very heart of my theology" (p. ix). We may readily accept this judgment, for in his wrestling with this ancient and notorious Christian perplexity, Ferré is led to develop still further and more complicated variations on his well-known and distinctive theological theme: Agape as the single, all-inclusive, final principle of explanation for all questions.

The basic pattern of ideas in *Evil and the Christian Faith* is at once simple in design and rich in detail. The discussion begins with the important contention that the problem of evil is never simply empirical nor purely speculative. Evil is never a "mere fact," and no explanation of it by a detached or uninvolved spectator of the human scene is ever adequate. At the level of empirical fact, evil is best characterized as false function, as maladaptation; but this largely ignores the note of tragedy that accompanies and complicates the evil fact (ch. II). At the level of aesthetic appreciation, evil may be partially understood in terms of "aesthetic contrast" and thus be justified as the contribution of a part to the whole. But this is always a rather cold-blooded and patronizing rationalization. It is only when we ponder the problem at its most concrete and real, at the level of personal and spiritual values, of tragedy and sin, that its dimensions are fully discerned and the possibilities for an existentially adequate solution are disclosed. At this level alone is the real evil identified as sin (p. 48); only here do we discover that "moral evil" is incalculably

more sinister and malignant than "natural evil." For evil may be defined as anything and everything which thwarts God's creative purposes (p. 34); the direst and most tragic form of this is the deliberate or consenting act of God's human creatures in defiance of or rebellion against His highest purpose, which is to create a loving fellowship. Evil of this sort is a function of freedom, and freedom is indispensable for the development and maturation of personal character. The possibility of sin and the reality of temptation are, therefore, necessary aspects of the human situation, but Ferré is almost always careful to deny that sin is a necessary part of God's purposes. Nevertheless, sin is "relatively necessary" to perfect the process of grace (p. 53): "Unless there is sin, grace has no meaning. Unless there is sin, love is never seen in its fullest depth" (p. 50).

The single and sufficient remedy for evil of every sort is God's Agape. By all the resources of God's free and unconditioned love, by His creative working in nature and history, and supremely by His suffering and redeeming love in Christ and His cross, the way is prepared for men "to pass from a needed attempt at self-security through self-despair to God-security" (p. 88). Thus God's love in action redeems history, secures our victory over tragedy and death, and insures the final accomplishment of God's true and unrelinquished purpose, "the ultimate salvation of all creatures, men, and we think, animals, in God's time and way" (p. 117). To this end, all things are means: nature, history, even human freedom and its abuses. To this end, all things will come, in God's time and way, to find their true good. This is the answer, and the experience, of Christian faith. It is, in Ferré's phrase, "the existential perspective of faith," but it does not conflict with nor can it be denied by the "explanatory perspective of reason."

A book like this disarms the friendly critic. It is so rich in authentic Christian wisdom and piety, so earnest and true in its practical affirmations, that its merits far outweigh its demerits. Yet there are defects, and some of them important. To begin with the least of these (although not the least obvious), there is the matter of Ferré's literary style. One might wish that so good a book were better written, and that a ruthless pencil had been used upon the all too frequent passages where ambiguity blurs crucial meanings or where jargon is substituted for explicit argument. Take, for example, the following not untypical

passage: "We start falsely with a perfect Adam, the First and Second, instead of with our animal and human continuity. Yet decisive discontinuity, transforming our continuity, is from above our explanatory rather than our existential continuity" (p. 100). Even in its full context, the meaning of this remains uncertain. It is unreasonable to demand of a theologian literary elegance, but it is equally improper to suffer his wilful obscurities without complaint.

Another, and perhaps more serious misgiving arises out of the excess of one of Ferré's most appealing virtues: his saintly optimism, his dauntless faith that Agape orders all things well. This is the best of all possible worlds (p. 49), though for slightly different reasons than those of Leibnitz. And even though the store of human suffering and tragedy is realistically inventoried, there is noticeably less of a tragic sense of life than one might have expected from so sensitive an observer in days like these. It is interesting, and significant, to mark the contrast in mood and perspective between Ferré and that of a modern Christian poet like W. H. Auden in *The Age of Anxiety*.

Still more serious, and complicated, is the issue raised by Ferré's agapist formula for the solution of all theological problems. The real question is whether God's essence can be adequately defined by a single attribute or function of His being, albeit the highest that we know or can conceive. Ferré concedes, upon occasion, that Agape is a principle, an attribute, the highest and most characteristic divine activity (p. 148). But, more often, he refers to Agape in hypostatic terms and assigns to it most, if not all, the predicables of deity. This is to confound essence and attribute, and the frequent consequence is an elaborate tautology. A further consequence is a simplicist reduction of all complications through the sovereign solvency of the Agape-concept. This is a bright moonglow in which contours are blurred. Agapism is as good a metaphysical panacea as any other—but no better; and we would do well to be wary of them all.

These criticisms are one way of saying that what is a very good book might well have been far better. The larger project, of which it is a part, will assuredly be a contribution of capital importance to Christian thought in this generation. Is it captious to express the hope that, in the remaining volumes, the form will measure up to the content in quality and appeal?

ALBERT C. OUTLER

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The Meaning of Existence. By CHARLES DUELL KEAN. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1947. xiv, 222 pp. $3.00.

This is a substantial and relatively clear, albeit brief presentation of Christian existentialism.

The author maintains that in postwar reconstruction human satisfactions must be achieved on three "levels" (p. 7): (1) the historical or natural, which is "the given," i.e., everything looked at in terms of structure, function, operation, and etiology (p. 34); (2) the intellectual, which is developed by abstraction, involving universalization, the concept of being, and logic, as well as rationalization and ideologies (pp. 69, 73, 80); and (3) the level of "Existence,"[1] which refers to human life in the sense of self-awareness in the context of vital decision and total commitment (pp. 89, n.1, 169). At this level the "now" and the "I-thou" relationship are crucial (pp. 94, 97). Commitment here removes tragedy and anxiety (pp. 99, 100, 108) and constitutes true Religion (p. 113).

True Religion is not in the purview of anthropology or psychology (pp. 113, 158); such considerations apply only to religions taken on the historical and intellectual levels. True Religion can not be adequately described in intellectual or objective terms (pp. 90, 193). It must be expressed mythically, myth being a description of man's existence [Existence?] in terms of a story related to history but oriented toward eternity; whether a myth is literally true or not is beside the point (pp. xii 113, 155). A creed accepts myth, a cult dramatizes it, and conduct implements it (p. 117).

Man must assert himself in the midst of history and the machinery of intellect. The only way man can give himself absolute significance in opposition to history is to affirm a creator God, with himself as the son (p. 119), although creationism as viewed from Existence is demonic (p. 128). Men who in faith accept Jesus as the Christ—as the revelation of God in human terms—discover the depths of their own personalities by that acceptance. Through the Cross they are freed from slavery to tragedy and anxiety, and by the Resurrection they

1. The device of capitalization for the words "Existence" and "Religion" when they are used in the specific senses here intended leads to some ambiguity when one of the words, taken in the more general sense, occurs at the beginning of a sentence and is capitalized for that reason, as well as when an uncapitalized adjectival form is intended to be understood in the specific sense. If the words are to be used in the two senses, the more specific might be indicated by italics.

know Jesus now on an I-thou basis (pp. 133, 160 ff.). The autonomy of the individual personality has to be crucified again and again; every vital decision contains the Cross and the Resurrection (pp. 178, 181).

Several terms familiar in neosupernaturalism—crisis, dimensions, tension, dialectic, demonic, transcendence, etc.—are used throughout the book, although for the most part they are not rubbed in until they become irritating. Sin and guilt are acknowledged, but, one might say, not celebrated. A critic might wish that the notion of dialectic were not made to cover so many differing problems and conflicts (e.g., pp. 34, 105, 145, 185, 216). A critic must, I think, deplore the implicit assumption that the existentialists are the only persons, particularly the only Christians, who recognize that religion is different from a philosophy of religion, or who feel guilt, or are troubled by crises, or achieve absolute personal commitment in faith and consecration. It is to be noted, too, that with all his absolute commitment, Existential man does not eliminate tragedy and anxiety (p. 132), or find in his faith a substitute for intelligence (p. 200), or claim unconditional validity (p. 195). Like the rest of us, after all, he "does the best he can" (pp. 195, 215).

Although the author maintains that the level of Existence cannot be adequately described in intellectual terms (p. 90), and although he often deprecates philosophical systems, a reviewer may be excused for some observations along these lines. The book's metaphysical "climate" (p. 151) is evidently a blend of neosupernaturalism, idealism, and what may be called valuational pragmatism (*cf.* pp. xiv, 87, 200). The connection with philosophies of values, or valuations, has to be read between the lines. Valuations, in fact, are not very highly esteemed (*cf.* pp. 31 f., 68). On the other hand, "meaning" is practically taken for granted without discussion, and any one concerned with contemporary discussions of that term, from Ogden and Richards to Russell and beyond, can detect the valuational factor and context here. Again, since the level of Existence concerns immediate experience, and is apprehended in a flash of insight in which objectivity is relative and externality is eliminated (pp. 12, 103, 149, 193), it might clarify at least some points if the view were admitted to be a variant of mysticism.

With its metaphysical climate identified as above, it is striking to see that this existentialism has much in common philosophically with the

liberal Protestantisms which it aims to correct or supplant; they also are built on supernaturalism, idealism, pragmatism, and some mysticism. The main differences are in existentialism's or neosupernaturalism's doctrines of transcendence, human and divine.

The distinctive philosophical issue is, then, whether these doctrines of transcendence really solve anything. As for human transcendence, any one who reflects knows something of mind's uniqueness, but neither perceptual presentations nor conceptual representations need to be glorified into existentialist transcendence. In fact, as the idealist philosophies show, both of these ordinary mental functions are likely to be distorted when such glamour is cast upon them. As for divine transcendence, or supertranscendence, if such a doctrine answers some questions it raises several others which are even more baffling. Psychologically and from the intellectual level, it looks like sublimation, a compensation and projection lately accentuated by the abysmal horrors of two wars.

Suppose we think for a moment of Christianity not as a valuable myth, whether it is true or false, but as a great painting, whether it is photographic or not—an ancient painting which, in the contemporary climate, is in spots scarred and peeling, and which according to all modern-minded men needs to have something done to it if it is to be preserved and retain its moving power. Liberalism, let us say, has attempted repeatedly to retouch the painting, but it is to be feared without much abiding success. Existentialism may be said, as above, partially to have employed the same philosophical techniques, but to go beyond them and, in its doctrines of transcendence, to transfer the whole painting to another canvas. That canvas, however, is too thin—that doctrine is too extravagant—to carry the load. Granting that mere retouching is not enough, and that some transference to a philosophy other than supernaturalism, idealism, pragmatism, and mysticism is imperative, a firmer and more substantial canvas, usually overlooked, now promises to become available. It is the canvas of naturalism, the universe of the sciences as empirically studied and adequately understood.

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BOOK NOTES

Papago Indian Religion. By RUTH M. UNDERHILL. (Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology, No. 33) New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. vi, 359 pp. $4.50.

To present lucidly all the materials which constitute "religion" in any special civilization is a difficult task. When the civilization is both strange and primitive the problem of exposition has multiple entanglements. So it is greatly to Dr. Underhill's credit that she has produced a book on an exotic religion which is without complexity, confusion, or contradiction. And this is not because Papago religious practice is simple, for, as ethnic studies have amply shown, a people with rude material arts and crafts may yet indulge in elaborate spiritual developments. Details of preparations, costumes, paraphernalia, ritual procedure, can be dull reading, but this bane, too, the author has avoided. Throughout the book she maintains a warm human treatment of her materials, an ability which derives from her own intimate experience with Papago daily life.

The Papago Indians of the Southern Arizona-Northern Mexico boundary area devoted a large part of their aboriginal life to religious rites aimed to "keep the world in order." This meant, in realistic terms, the procession of the seasons, sufficient rain, smooth functioning of village and personal life. The religion was not so much one of philosophic doctrine as of anxious endeavor, with emphasis placed upon formalized ritual. The efficacious techniques were prayers, speeches, songs, and dances; these had a mythologic basis for their content, though marked deviation from traditional lore is evident when myth and ritual are compared.

The Papago concept of supernatural power Dr. Underhill presents as follows:

> Not only the animals are living powers. Every part of the natural environment is also personified and must be treated with circumspection and respect. The individual, when going about his duties, should never attack nature roughly, but explain his need and ask for help. "I have come to get clay," says the woman who is digging material for her pots, "be favorable to me." The hunter, bending over a dead deer, apologizes: "I have killed you because I need food. Do not be angry." The planter, taking a handful of corn kernals from his pouch, adjures them: "I am dropping you into the earth. Now ripen well." It is a religion whose every act is focused upon the forces of nature, constraining them to help man or, at least not to hinder his arduous tasks.
>
> Those forces are not either good or evil. The Papago do not explain the supernatural world as a dualism, inhabited by both kindly and maleficent spirits. Rather, it is permeated by power which is helpful or destructive according to the medium through which it passes. A good being, human or supernatural, will use it for good; a bad one for evil (p. 16).

The ceremonies fall into two main classes. There are communal ceremonies which are of benefit to and are performed by and for the people of organized village groups: Rainmaking Ceremony, Ceremonies to Promote Growth (of

crops), Hunting and Intervillage Game Ceremonies, and the rain-bringing Prayerstick Festival. Individual religious powers are obtained through another set of ceremonies: Warfare Ritual, Salt Pilgrimage, Eagle-killing, and the Girls' Puberty Dance.

Regardless of the type of ceremony, religious expression is chiefly through the medium of song: songs describing the mythologic past, the environmental present, the desirable future, the experiences of dream life. It is the recording and translating of these which is Dr. Underhill's forte. Were their authenticity not above question, many readers might doubt the native verbal power and beauty of phrase exhibited on page after page of the book. The following is but a random sample, a part of the sung accompaniment to a group dance, referring to the ever-desired blessing of rain:

> The mist rises
> And lies in this direction.
> It lies at the base of the mountains;
> It lies deep under them.
> Thither I came.
> It caught me.
> And fine rain sifted over me.
> The earth grew very green (p. 123).

The Papago are not unique in their native religious capacity, but they epitomize the Southwestern Indians' ability to compose words, music, and dance pantomime around central themes which express their manifold desires. Pleasing, surprising, rewarding, is Dr. Underhill's account of this so-called primitive religion.

A. H. GAYTON

The Legend of King Keret: A Canaanite Epic of the Bronze Age. By H. L. GINSBERG. (Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, Supplementary Studies Nos. 2-3.) New Haven, 1946. 50 pp., 2 plates. $1.25.

It is no exaggeration to say that the greatest and most brilliant single discovery in the field of Old Testament studies in the last two decades was that made by the French archaeologist, C. F. A. Schaeffer, in 1930 at Ras Shamra, ancient Ugarit, on the coast of northern Syria. There he found, in successive campaigns lasting to 1939, a large number of clay tablets written in a previously unknown cuneiform alphabet and composed in a language closely related to the Hebrew of the Old Testament. The contents of nearly all of these tablets, with the exception of some administrative and commercial documents, are of a religious and mythological character. While some of the tablets unearthed by Schaeffer were written in the fifteenth century B.C., the others, unquestionably, represent copies of much older texts. "The Legend of King Keret" was most probably composed sometime between 1800 and 1375 B.C.;

the contents of the Baal and Aqhat epics, however, may go as far back as the third millennium.

The locale of this legend is western Syria and the hero of the story is a king of the city of Hubur, named Keret. This Keret, we are told, was bereft of his entire family and he therefore pleaded with the gods to grant him posterity. El, the supreme deity of the Ugaritic pantheon, advised him to marry Princess Hurriya of the distant kingdom of Udum. The marriage proved highly successful, and Keret was blessed with many sons and daughters. Then we learn that Keret became seriously ill and that El resorted to magic in order to cure him from his sickness. This he accomplished by fashioning an image (of Keret?) and by dispatching to him a specially created female creature. While the king was convalescing, his oldest son, the heir-apparent, Yassib, grew impatient and suggested to Keret that he abdicate his throne. This act of filial impiety enraged the father greatly, who in turn cursed his son for his insolence.

The great importance of the Keret text does not lie primarily in its story which was composed by a local poet for reasons unknown to us. Its chief value lies in the language in which it was written, and in the fact that the Canaanites of the second millennium, of whose literary achievements we knew practically nothing twenty years ago, have suddenly emerged as a people possessed of a great literary tradition.

Professor Ginsberg, whose many contributions in the field of translation and elucidation of the Ugaritic texts have proved him to be not only a master of the language but also a scholar endowed with a deep insight in ancient literature and history, has again placed students of Semitic languages in his debt. The translation of the Legend of King Keret (with the transliterated text in parallel columns) is a masterpiece of mature scholarship, and the copious philological, lexical, exegetical, and historical notes, which fill eighteen closely printed pages, are a veritable treasure of information.

I. M.

The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion. By Joseph Greenberg. New York: J. J. Augustin, 1946. 73 pp. $2.50.

The subject of this small book is the effect of Islam on the religious beliefs and practices of a Negro people—the inhabitants of Kano city and environs in Northern Nigeria—one segment of the Hausa-speaking region in Central Sudan. To that end, field studies were undertaken (October, 1938—August, 1939) both in Kano city, where Moslem influence predominates, and among the rural pagans of the area. Under the general supervision of Professor M. J. Herskovitz, of Northwestern University, the author prosecuted his task on a fellowship from the Social Science Research Council, submitted his findings as a doctoral dissertation, and offered it for publication by the American Ethnological Society.

The central conclusion is that a new culture emerges, a tertium quid, when two older ones fuse. The synthesis of Islam and the Negro paganism here ex-

amined cannot be adequately described as a simple mixture from the pre-existing stores. The end product of culture fusion resembles a chemical rather than a mechanical mixture, as the earlier studies of Linton among American Indian tribes showed.

Islam reached Kano, in specifically North African guise, through secondary diffusion from the Moslem Negroes of the Central Niger territory. Contact with truly Moslem folk was rare, and actual Islamization depended upon a class of native Malams (Ar. *mu'allim*, teacher). These constitute the acculturating element of the population who passed what they found in the Islamic literary sources to the indigenous stock. They identified the native spirits *('iskókī)*, worshiped by the pagan Hausa, with the *jinn* which figure in the Islamic tradition. The result represents another instance of pagan deities which survive the advent of a monotheistic religion.

Dr. Greenberg has produced a valuable work which will be used not only by students of ethnology and acculturation but by primitive and comparative religionists as well. He has overcome his initial difficulty with Arabic sources by the use of reliable translations. "Islam" and "Mohammedanism" are used alternately in the text, although Islamic belief shows preference for the former. For the cumbersome "Maghrebine," the form Maghribi, authorized by Webster's Dictionary, might have been substituted. Lacking an index, but provided with a well-balanced table of contents, a bibliography, and copious documentation, the monograph deserves more than passing notice. A work of painstaking effort and keen observation, it sheds light on a little known and often neglected field.

EDWARD J. JURJI

The United States and the Near East. By EPHRAIM A. SPEISER. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947. xi, 263 pp. $2.50.

Although this book is concerned primarily with the role played by the Near East as the great cross-roads for world commerce and aviation and as one of the largest sources for oil, the author stresses the enduring elements in the cultural tradition of this area. Here the interests of the Big Three Powers are focused, and also from here are the springs of the world's three great monotheistic faiths.

Today the religion of Islam is dominant in the Arab world, and, although the Arabs of the Near East do not exceed forty millions in population, their future destiny is the concern of Muslims numbering nearly a hundred millions in India, seventy millions in Netherlands Indies, twenty-five millions in Russia and twenty millions in China. Dr. Speiser, who is Professor of Semitics at the University of Pennsylvania, reminds us of "a curious coincidence that much of the Eastern Hemisphere's wealth in natural resources—and particularly petroleum resources—is concentrated along the extended stretch which is often called the Islamic belt."

It is unfortunate that a few slight errors mar this excellent account of the

background and the present and future problems of the Near East. Hasan Sabri Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, did not suffer a fatal heart attack while reading the throne speech Nov. 14th, 1941, but on that date in 1940. He was not succeeded by Ali Pasha Mahir but by Hussein Sirri Pasha (p. 98).

In forecasting the opportunity for the United States in the Near East and the responsibility that accompanies the position now held, the author emphasizes the essential interdependence of past and present, East and West, idealism and realism. The Near East includes ". . . a spiritual center sacred to one half the population of the world. The region as a whole . . . is a sensitive barometer of the mood and temper of a world whose fate has become indivisible but whose nations are not yet united. The anxious watchman looks thus to the Near East for a sign of what tomorrow may have in store."

E. E. ELDER

A Factual Survey of the Moslem World with Maps and Statistical Tables. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1946. 33 pp. 75¢.

In his introduction to this most useful brochure, Dr. Zwemer stresses the unity of the "World of Islam,"—a solidarity based upon a "vertebrate and virile creed." The statistical tables show a grand total of more than 315,000,000 Mohammedans in the world, and the maps reveal Islam's equally staggering extent of territory. In view of these sobering facts, the present political imbroglio is not difficult to understand.

M. B.

Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. By GERSHOM G. SCHOLEM. New York: Schocken Books, 1947. xv, 454 pp. $5.50.

In *The Review of Religion* for November 1943, I reviewed and summarized Professor Scholem's epoch-making study of the mystical aspects of Jewish thought. That summary was very detailed because few copies of the first, Palestinian edition came through to this country. Now the American branch of the original publisher has made a second edition of the book available in an attractive form with some slight additions by the author; unfortunately the conditions under which the new edition has been prepared have made impossible the inclusion of some of the interesting new material relating especially to the Sabbatian heresy, on which Professor Scholem has been working (published in Hebrew in the periodicals *Tarbiz* and *Zion*). Despite the fact that its author has carried his own studies beyond what appears in the book, this new edition of *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* should be in the library of every student of religion, for it is rich both in content and in wisdom.

J. L. B.

Les Premières strophes de l'Apocalypse (Cahiers de littérature sacrée, I). By A. Olivier. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1947. 94 pp.

Many are the solutions proposed for the riddle of the Apocalypse! The latest, by M. Olivier, views the book as poetic throughout, arranged mathematically—almost geometrically—and inspired by the peculiar non-rhythmic, non-metrical type of "poetry" (if it can be called poetry) which characterizes most of holy writ. It is a type of literary structure for which important words and their meanings take the place of ordinary words and their sounds. (This goes a long way beyond *Schallanalyse,* popular in Germany before the war.) Indeed, it is a type of writing appropriate to divine revelation, as M. Olivier aptly quotes from St. Chrysostom's First Homily on John, on his title-page: "It is not to the fisherman, not to the son of Zebedee, but to the One who knows the deep things of God, to the Spirit, I should say, who touches this lyre, that we should open our ears."

The author is familiar with the great works, ancient and modern, upon the Apocalypse; but he views them—especially modern critical works—as on a false track. Instead of "sources," the apocalyptist has merely taken over a small quantity of earlier material and completely reworked it. The problem of grammar and style is solved upon the assumption that, along with the rest of the New Testament, the book underwent an "initial recension" (long before the Byzantine), and that thereafter numerous "retouches" occurred—not of the nature of a thorough-going recension. We are reminded of the theory of Fr. J. Bover, stated in the prolegomena to his great new edition of the Greek and Latin New Testament (Madrid, 1943), viz., that the text of the Apocalypse grew corrupt during the days of the controversy, when the eyes of the bishops were less vigilant in safeguarding it. (The problem is, of course, a most serious one for those who assume, upon ecclesiastical authority or otherwise, that the author of the Apocalypse can be no other than the author of the Gospel of John and the three Epistles.) On the whole, Olivier prefers the "neutral" text of Westcott and Hort.

So far, so good. There is much in the author's demonstration that will commend itself to other scholars. But when we come to the neat analysis of the composition into six parts, with 60 pericopes, 600 lines, and 888 "grammatical elements" in each part—one hesitates, and asks for time for further study. The author makes much of his theory of the mathematical arrangement by "grammatical elements," though the term may cover a simple *kai* or an extended phrase like "on the Lord's day." 888 is the cryptogram for Ἰησοῦς, as 666 is the cryptogram for the Beast in chapter XIII.

The volume is an introduction to a more extended work which the author hopes to publish, covering the rest of the Apocalypse, and supporting his thesis with additional evidence. He writes with great learning, considerable insight, and there is no question of the fascination of his views. But though one may go a fair way in agreement with him, it is natural and legitimate to hesitate in accepting his full thesis before the work is complete.

Frederick C. Grant

Orthodox Statements on Anglican Orders. Edited by E. R. HARDY, JR. New York: Morehouse Gorham Co., 1947. xxiii, 72 pp. $1.00.

This is a very handy collection if authoritative statements on Anglican orders made by the different Orthodox Churches. It includes, also, reports of official Orthodox-Anglican Theological Conferences and two discussions, one by Prof. Pantaleimon Komnenos of the Theological Seminary at Halki and one by Patriarch Sergius of Moscow. In general the introduction by Dr. Hardy gives a good explanation of the background of Anglican-Orthodox relations and the role that the doctrine of "economy" plays in them. On the whole, Professor Komnenos is much more liberal in his outlook than is Patriarch Sergius. It will be easily seen that the question of ordinations is only part of a much larger problem, the defining of the extent to which the Anglican and Orthodox Churches must be in harmony before a definite reunion can be brought into being. Much has already been accomplished in the spheres of history and theology, but the differences in the psychology of the two Churches offer the greatest difficulties, which will require hard and systematic work, before they are removed. Yet there is no reason to be discouraged, for the combination of British theological scholarship and the American practical contacts with the large Orthodox Churches in the United States has, certainly, already produced worthwhile results.

C. A. M.

The Affirmation of Immortality. (The Ingersoll Lecture on the Immortality of Man for 1946). By JOHN HAYNES HOLMES. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. 75 pp. $1.50.

Countering the "low estate of the immortal hope" in our materialistic age, Dr. John Haynes Holmes, in "Affirmations of Immortality," quietly admits that within the range of naturalistic thought we cannot submit definite proof that man is immortal. Nor can unbelievers in their turn be sure of maintaining their unbelief, for, as Browning pointed out,

> "Just when we are safest, there's a sunset touch,
> A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
> A chorus-ending from Euripides—
> And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears. . . ."

The materialist must perforce remain neutral. However, as soon as man imposes a spiritual interpretation of life, he therewith creates a world other than the physio-chemical world of marvels and terrors that triumphs today.

For this spiritual interpretation, Dr. Holmes draws freely on the thinking of the great down the ages, a method by which he achieves brilliant results as a lecturer. There is, for instance, Plato's projection of faith into the unknown through his "majestic conception of the realm of Ideas as the abode of the eternal," wherewith he forever has established the proposition that "immortal life is a necessary element in any spiritual interpretation of reality." Though

the testimony of the mystics is not generally accepted as a valid part of knowledge, Dr. Holmes argues that mysticism as a constant experience is verifiable by correspondence with itself, since in far-flung lands or in alien tongues all have borne a single witness to a single truth.

The modern mind explains man by stressing the development of the ego, or self-consciousness, and the sense of a stream of time in which past, present, and future are integral parts—in short, a sense of eternity. Scintillating as the very stars themselves are the sentences quoted from Thomas Hardy: "To persons standing alone on a hill during a clear midnight such as this, the roll of the world eastward is almost a palpable motion," and to enjoy the epic form of the poetry of motion you must "stand long and quietly watch your stately progress through the stars." When man thus discovers the eternal, adds Dr. Holmes, he discovers his immortal soul.

The evolutionary process itself, indicating purpose, is also listed on this record of faith as an affirmation. The very labors of the process can be justified only if something survives in case some cosmic cataclysm precipitates primeval chaos. That something is man's imperishable spirit—the answer to the cosmic riddle. "The more thoroughly the evolutionary process is understood, the more certain it becomes that the universe has been laboring to the production of a reality that will survive and fulfil itself." The immortal soul is the goal of evolution, and thus the immortal hope is "the logic of the cosmic process."

Little black letters on white pages within the covers of a slender book cannot adequately reflect the fiery glow of conviction that lights words, sentences, ideas, affirmations, when Dr. Holmes faces the sort of audiences from which he, as well, draws inspiration. But this volume, as the 1946 addition to the noted Ingersoll lectureship at Harvard College, reaches a wider reading public and deserves to become one of the "imperatives" of our atomic age.

ALMA LUISE OLSON

Foundations of Democracy. A series of addresses Edited by F. ERNEST JOHNSON. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. ix, 278 pp. $2.00.

The arrangement of this book would lead one to believe that it throws light upon the question of religious contributions to freedom. It does, but not in a way acceptable to some of the contributors to this symposium who go so far as to claim a latent Christianity in all really significant democratic utterances (A. N. Wilder). The fact which the book seems to establish is that democratic forms and the democratic spirit are of very recent crystalization and largely secular, while the preconditions are religious.

The religious apologists definitely overstate their claim and come out badly, while the secular writer, Horace M. Kallen, shows remarkable restraint and even humility in his statement of humanistic origins.

There are some excellent bits of information, especially the address of Louis Finkelstein, and the book is to be recommended. The limitations are

unfortunate. The contributions bear the character of assignments which too often sent their authors culling sources. In their eagerness the purpose of the book was sometimes lost in secondary research. The gap between the democratic ideal and the social reality can be better illuminated by those rare people who bare in their bodies the marks of the struggle. The scholars are expert in describing these advances but not in initiating them.

FREDERICK REUSTLE

Christianity Takes a Stand. Edited by BISHOP WILLIAM SCARLETT. New York: Penguin Books Inc., 1946. 128 pp. 25 cents.

The importance of this book is that it represents the effort of a particular Church to give concrete guidance concerning the major social problems of our time. It is a symposium edited by Bishop William Scarlett in behalf of the Joint Commission on Social Reconstruction of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church. The authors have in most cases expressed themselves elsewhere more fully on the subjects discussed, but their brief chapters in this volume at least indicate certain directions in which the thought of the leadership of the Church is moving. The authors come from several denominations, and there is a good combination of clergy and laymen. Mrs. Roosevelt and Sumner Welles write what they might have written under any auspices, but the other writers do try to relate what they have to say to the distinctively Christian perspective.

Bishop Angus Dun, in the opening chapter, lays the foundation by presenting the reasons for the social responsibility of the Christian and of the Church. Persuasively and beautifully written, it is close to the social thinking of William Temple though, perhaps, less precise than Temple on the application of Christian ethics to social problems. The other chapter that deals with the fundamental issues is Eduard Heimann's, on "Man and the State," which is a summary of much in his recent book on *Freedom and Order.* It is one of the most profound discussions of the relation between Christianity and Democracy that I have read.

The other chapters deal with concrete issues. Professor Niebuhr gives a characteristic analysis of the mutual distrust between America and Russia, with the emphasis placed upon Russia's sense of insecurity, an emphasis that he might revise today because he has a greater fear of Russian aggressiveness. This chapter is far more sober and detached than most of the things that Americans now say about Russia, and so it deserves attention. Professor Hocking has written perhaps the most original chapter, because of his discussion of the nature of punishment. His conclusions about Germany are on the side of those who have faith in the possible regeneration of Germany and

have no confidence in long range security against Germany based primarily upon coercion. In this respect Professor Hocking has well expressed the dominant view among Church leaders, including liberals, as against the dominant view among liberals outside the Church. Arthur Compton has written a very conventional article about the atomic bomb which tries to put the best face possible upon its use in Japan. There are excellent statements about the race problem by Dr. Walter Russell Bowie, Bishop Parsons, and Mrs. Roosevelt. The first is a general analysis of the issue based upon Myrdal; the second is an account of the evacuation of Japanese Americans by one who saw the whole sad process at close range; the third is a brief exhortation expressing the author's fine sensitivities and generous spirit. Miss Francis Perkins summarizes what the government has done and what it should do under the new Employment Act about unemployment.

It is significant that, whenever economic issues are mentioned, the assumptions are always on the side of New Deal experimentalism or to the left of that. Among the laymen in the Protestant Churches, of whom neither Mrs. Roosevelt nor Miss Perkins is typical, conservative assumptions are prevalent, and today there is a revival of a reactionary spirit in economics. Yet the assumptions of this book are undoubtedly in line with those of the theological, and even to a considerable extent of the ecclesiastical, leadership in the Churches. It is the conviction of this reviewer that this book is sound in its orientation and that, however difficult it may be to deduce a positive social system from Christian faith and Christian ethics with complete confidence, the criticism of this reactionary trend will have the last word in the Church.

JOHN C. BENNETT

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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